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Since 1994, partisanship has increasingly dominated American politics. This has affected the 
ways that opposition parties and the Presidency have interacted in the development of foreign 
policy. This thesis argues that polarization means that key foreign policy legislation has 
increasingly been passed along partisan lines and that this has constrained the future use of 
treaties, legislative-executive agreements, and the President’s unilateral means to achieve 
détente.  The thesis concludes that in the long term, this means that American foreign policy will 
be predisposed to unilateralism and that Presidential transitions of power will likely bring a 
greater shift in foreign policy priorities. 
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The American Presidency’s power derives from the from the high profile of the office and the 
impression that the president is the single most important person in enacting policy.1 As a result, 
presidents are rewarded for enacting new policies and thus come into office with a wide range of 
domestic and foreign policy initiatives.2 
Because presidents consciously seek legitimation through foreign policy, the president’s 
domestic rivals have an interest in preventing an easy foreign policy win.3 This has not always 
been the case. In the past relations between the two parties were much more stable, with the 
Democratic Party holding a large majority in both houses of Congress. The Democratic majority 
meant that the Republican Party could not muster enough votes to foil any Democratic 
legislation and as a result, Republican leaders were convinced they could achieve greater policy 
victories through acting in a conciliatory manner rather than open conflict.4 
However, with the 1994 Congressional election, the Republican Party was able to take control 
over the House. And since then, majorities between the parties have been extremely slim.5 With 
both parties in a dead heat for control of Congress, both parties have had a strong incentive to 
embark on a combative style of politics to rile up the voter base. As a result, bipartisanship has 
increasingly become a politically unfeasible as working with the rival majority party increases 
 
1 Neustadt 1990, 73-77 
2 Neustadt 1990, Chapter 2, 68-70. 
3 Lee 2016, 62-64 
4 Lee 2016, 76-81 
5 Lee 2016, 26-27 
2 
 
the majority party’s mandate to govern.6 This means that under the current party system, both 
parties seek to prevent the other from winning a policy argument without significant costs. 
In great deal because of increased party competition, geographic, ideological and demographic 
sorting between the two parties has become more intense. Geographically, party support has 
increasingly important for the Republican Party in the South and Midwest while the Democratic 
Party has created a strong base of support amongst the coasts and the cities. Since neither of 
these geographic areas can deliver a majority, both parties have intensified their competition 
amongst swing areas – especially in the suburbs.7  
For the Republican Party, geographic entrenchment has been accompanied by a media one. Since 
the Republican Party’s support base has remained relatively homogenous, voter support has 
increasingly been buttressed by the formation of conservative media outlets.8 On the other hand, 
the Democratic Party has struggled relative to this, as their governing coalition has remained 
relatively more diverse. This has meant two things – that Democratic Party has had to recraft its 
policy to appeal to a demographically wide base and that it has not been able to utilize such a 
strong system of alternative media.9  
As a result, of parties appealing to separate demographics and engaging with separate media, 
political divides in America have become tied into greater cultural conflict.10 This greatly widens 
the amount of issues and events that either side can conceive of as political and ensures that 
 
6 Lee 2016, 42-52 
7 Black and Black 2007 
8 Grossman 2016, Chapter 3 
9 Grossman 2016, 93-102 
10 Klein 2020 and Shafer 2016, 146 
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voters are more likely to discipline elected politicians perceived as being too conciliatory or 
collegial with their cross party opponents.11 
Such a dynamic has meant that both parties have formed distinct sociopolitical paradigms and 
that party affiliation has become the key determinant on a politician’s voting record.12 This is 
strongly contrasted with the previous era of Congress where both parties were ideologically 
diverse and cross party voting amongst both Congressional and Senate members was relatively 
common.13  
For the Republican Party, this has meant that more of their elected officials have taken a more 
unilateral approach towards foreign relations and an increased emphasis on military strength. 
This contrasts with Democratic politicians who, while remaining relatively more ideologically 
diverse than the Republican Party, have tended to push for multilateralism as a key tenet of 
foreign policy.14 Such a fundamental difference in paradigms ensures that even in foreign policy 
areas of great interest, the solutions proposed between the two have diverged. This increases the 
likelihood of partisan discord whenever a foreign policy solution is proposed and provides an 
opportunity for the opposition party to demonstrate its disagreement with the President. 
This thesis examines how a President has numerous institutional advantages in executing foreign 
policy vis a vis Congress. The President has several advantages in foreign policy. As the head of 
all federal agencies, the President can direct federal agencies immediately with executive orders 
and often has access to information prior to Congress.15 And given an aggressive enough 
 
11 Klein 2020 
12 Lee 2016 and Shafer 2016, 121-144 
13 Lee 2016, Chapter 6 and Shafer 2016, 133,150 
14 Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007, 24-26 and Dueck 2010 
15 Bolton and Thrower 2016, 661 
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President, this can be used to overwhelm Congressional capacity to monitor such international 
events. Nevertheless, this is not unlimited. The Senate is still needed for the treaty mechanism to 
be used and while the executive branch can use executive orders, Congress has the ability to craft 
laws that constrains the executive’s ability to act.16 Thus, for a President to execute a successful 
foreign policy, a degree of cooperation with Congress is necessary.  
Nonetheless, polarization has greatly increased the political costs for the opposition party to 
work with the President. Thus, unless the President has a congressional supermajority, the 
opposition party will have a strong incentive and the means to push against foreign policy 
achievements that could be perceived as legitimizing the Presidency. This means that American 
Presidents will have to rely on unilateral methods to execute foreign policy and that formerly 
bipartisan ratified treaties may be revisited. This has and undoubtedly will change the ability of 
an American President to conduct diplomacy, especially in matters of détente. Overall, this 
means that American policy may be more prone to fluctuation with the transfer of power 
between party lines and increased pressure and often reversals on previously bipartisan foreign 
policy issues. 
This dynamic will be explored through a series of papers.  Chapter one outlines whether a 
President chooses to conduct their administration’s top foreign policy priorities through 
unilateral mechanisms due to political polarization by conducting a comparative analysis of the 
passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA). In both cases, a Democratic President was able to achieve significant 
foreign policy achievement despite domestic political opposition. Nevertheless, the greater 
 
16 Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 14-47 and Prins and Marshall 2009, 191 
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polarization of the American public during the years following the passage of NAFTA ensured 
that the disagreement over the JCPOA was largely found amongst party lines whereas NAFTA 
found strong support in the Republican Party (the then opposition party). This meant that 
NAFTA was overall perceived positively between both parties whereas the JCPOA lacked 
legitimacy amongst Republican legislators and faced multiple attempts at annulment prior to a 
later Republican administration terminating the United States participation. Such findings 
demonstrate the legitimizing role bipartisan agreement plays on foreign policy and 
simultaneously shows that such consensus has been more difficult to achieve under political 
polarization.  
Chapter two examines how political polarization has shaped the views of treaties ratified under 
bipartisan consensus over time by analyzing Republican legislators views of the New Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). President Barrack Obama (D; 2008-2016) and his 
administration emphasized improved Russo-American relations and greater counter-proliferation 
efforts as a key priority for the administration. And despite increasing Republican opposition to 
the Obama administration’s policies, the treaty mustered 13 Republican votes on the Senate 
floor. Almost a decade later, Obama’s Republican successor sought to allow the treaty to expire 
which garnered little Republican opposition. This brings up the question on what caused such a 
change in opinion. Key findings in the paper demonstrate substantive shifts in Republican 
foreign policy and greater willingness to jettison previously established legislature as major 
reasons why the New Start treaty has lost standing with many acting Republican legislators. 
Such papers bring up the issue of shifting policy preferences as a result of polarization in 
American foreign policy and a possible revisiting of previously bipartisan treaties. 
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The third chapter will examine the historical effects of political polarization on the President’s 
ability to negotiate by examining the Clinton (D; 1993-2001) administration’s pursuit of 
denuclearization in North Korea. In this case study, the Clinton administration pursued a 
bipartisan goal of containing the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK but faced domestic political 
scrutiny from the Republican controlled House of Representatives. Findings of the paper 
demonstrate the Clinton White House’s relationship with the House of Representatives as a key 
reason why the Agreed Framework, a Clinton administration negotiated executive agreement 
between North Korea, failed. Such paper points the likelihood of continued negative 
relationships with North Korea specifically and more broadly, to the great difficulty a future 
American President will face while seeking détente. 
The thesis concludes with a review on lessons learned from each of the case studies. The 
conclusion notes that bilateral and multilateral engagement have been more difficult to execute 
under polarization whereas polarization has left American unilateral methods of diplomacy 
relatively unscathed. Furthermore, polarization has meant that new Presidents are more likely to 
come into office with sharply different policy preferences from another party, further decreasing 
the likelihood of bipartisan cooperation. Finally, partisan polarization has meant that Presidential 
initiatives at tension reduction have created pressure for most forms of diplomacy to become 
grand bargains – that being opposition criticism has created significant pressure for the 
Presidency to achieve a solution that would solve all outstanding issues.  At the end of the 
conclusion, three possible solutions – the changing of presidential rhetoric, reapportionment of 
committee seats, and the possible return towards a single party dominated system will be 
assessed, with both the rewards and consequences of each proposed solution being examined in 
relation to the others. 
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In conclusion, these three chapters will increase our understanding of the intersections of 
American domestic and foreign politics by examining how the methods of American foreign 
policy are impacted by polarization, how partisanship affects the domestic legitimacy of treaties, 
and how polarization effects the President’s ability to negotiate and maintain unconventional 
diplomacy. Overall, such information will show that American domestic politics plays a 
formidable role in the country’s foreign relations and that a bifurcated American policy is more 






















Political Polarization and Executive Unilateralism: 
Introduction: 
Today American politics is greatly defined by political polarization. Legislation is often 
passed along party lines and routine legislation from national budgets to international treaties 
have often been subsumed into a greater conflict of approval or disapproval over the President’s 
standing. It is unsurprising then that such political polarization plays an increasingly large role 
over the ways a President enacts high profile policy. 
While some areas of American foreign policy may muster a small bipartisan consensus, the 
opposition party is most likely to view new foreign policy initiatives as legitimizing the 
Presidency and therefore are more likely to seek to prevent them from being enacted. As a result, 
a President’s ability to conduct foreign affairs through executive legislative agreement will be 
constrained.  
This has massive implications for American foreign policy. Legislative-executive agreements 
solely passed along party lines may be viewed as illegitimate amongst domestic opposition. This 
increases the chance of a bifurcated American foreign policy – wherein states are less likely to 
risk negotiating with a President whose policies may be abandoned in the next administration. 
Conversely, other states may take notice of U.S. domestic discord and may seek to hedge against 
a possible U.S. disengagement or may actively seek to bolster U.S. parties whose political views 
may closely align with its views.  
This can be seen through a comparative analysis of the passage of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which remain 
two of the most notable executive-legislative agreements involving foreign affairs. While the 
subject matter of such agreements may seem far apart, the nature of the political debate over 
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such agreements has greatly changed between the passage of such treaties. While NAFTA was 
confirmed in a bipartisan fashion, political suspicion towards the agreement was mainly focused 
amongst the Democratic Party. This stands in great contrast to the passage of the JCPOA which 
although had Democratic detractors, was able to come into effect through unified Democratic 
support. Given such trends, it is likely that future high profile foreign policy legislative executive 
agreements will be confirmed primarily through party lines. 
To examine the validity of this thesis, the relevant literature is reviewed showing that 
polarization is a long-term trend in American politics due to the distinct nature of each party’s 
voter base and the roughly equal electoral strength of the parties. In addition, further research 
will review the mechanisms behind foreign policy revealing that there is no permanent 
separation of powers and that the limits of the executive and legislative branch are renegotiated 
depending on the strength of either side. This turns foreign policy into a political consideration as 
each party will adjust its foreign policy based on their strength in Congress or the Presidency. 
Context on the passage of both NAFTA and the JCPOA will then be reviewed, with the nature of 
the domestic opposition to both treaties being explained. Domestic opposition will be compared 
between both legislative agreements and successive Congresses in general. Finally, implications 
of increased foreign policy polarization will be reviewed. 
Political Polarization: 
American politics is dominated by competition between the Democratic and Republican 
parties, who despite having conducted multi-billion dollar campaigns have been unable to 
decisively swing the electorate in either direction. It is little surprise then that literature focused 
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on the party system in American politics focuses on the demographic and social roots of partisan 
identification and the extreme structural differences between the two parties.   
Literature focused on the geographic polarization on either party notes that the support base for 
the Democratic Party resides in the Pacific Coast and the Northeast.17 Likewise the Republican 
Party trends strongly in the South and the Mountains/Plains region of the United States.18 The 
remaining regions of the United States – mainly the Midwest has become the key to national 
dominance due to the even distribution of supporters of either side of the aisle.19 Key to this 
region then, is the suburban white vote – a group which accounts for the majority of white votes 
in the region and that neither party has gained a consistent majority of.20 The increasing 
clustering of party support has led many to argue that this has polarized the United States.21 
However, while geographic patterns have shown a distinctive effect on polarization, it is not the 
sole explanation.22 
Geographic patterns are not the only differences between either party’s support base. In fact, the 
internal coalitions making up either party are so different that the parties scarcely resemble each 
other internally. For the Republican Party, the voter coalition party is relatively straightforward – 
being compromised of a coherent ideologically conservative movement that has gradually moved 
towards the right.23 Thus, Republican Party voters tend to see their party in ideological terms – 
viewing their affinity to the party as being motivated by the Party’s adherence to their 
 
17 Black and Black 2007, 1 
18 Black and Black 2007, 1 
19 Black and Black 2007, 125-127 
20 Black and Black 2007, 135 
21 Sussell and Thomson 2015, 1 
22 Sussell and Thomson 2015, 25-26 
23 Grossman and Hopkins, 2016, 15 
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conservative ideals.24 However this ideological adherence is not necessarily reflected in the 
demographics of the Democratic Party. Instead, partisan identification of Democratic voters is 
motivated primarily by the Democratic party’s alignment towards the voter’s demographics.25 
This is likewise reflected in the ideological alignment of the Democratic Party – only shifting 
slightly towards the left since the 1970s.26 Fundamentally differing visions of politics have meant 
that the Republican party’s appeal to less ideological voters have been stunted while the 
Democratic politicking is frustrated by a lack of a common political creed.27 
Despite the insular nature of each party’s political base, both parties remain electorally 
competitive vis a vis the other.28And it is because of each party’s equally matched status that has 
furthered American political divisions. Previously, the Republican party remained a solid 
minority party throughout the legislature.29 However the accession of Reagan to the White House 
in 1980 marked the first time a conservative Republican won the White House.30 Emboldened by 
this the Republican Party was finally able to win a narrow legislative majority in 1994, marking 
an era of inter-party competition.31 This has transformed legislative politics. Previously, a stable 
electoral majority meant that legislation was determined on the basis of its effects on the 
legislators individual electoral benefit.32 However, with the greater legislative majority on the 
line, Congressmen are more likely to view elections through partisan conflict.33 Because of this 
paradigmatic shift, Congressmen and women are additionally incentivized to seek discernment 
 
24 Grossman and Hopkins 2016, 11 
25 Grossman and Hopkins 2016, 37 
26 Grossman and Hopkins 2016, 11 
27 Grossman and Hopkins 2016, 319-324 
28 Lee 2016, 1 
29 Lee 2016, 18 
30 Lee 2016, 39 
31 Lee 2016, 37 
32 Lee 2016, 41 
33 Lee 2016, 41 
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on issues to give a reason to their constituency on why they should vote for themselves over their 
party rivals.34 As a result, bipartisanship on a broad range of issues is now considered a vice, not 
a virtue.35  
This has far reaching effects on Congressional power. Since polarization has shown to have a 
strongly negative effect on the ability of Congress to exert its ability to legislate.36 Even in cases 
of unified government, polarization still tends to leading to legislative gridlock.37 Although 
legislative gridlock has been shown to decrease in cases of veto-proof majorities, this does little 
to change the status quo since current legislative polarization primarily derives from the current 
system of slim majorities.38  
As a result of greater political competition, foreign policy will likely become another avenue for 
political competition. While domestic politics ostensibly remains separate from foreign affairs, 
the possibility of economic gains and losses act as a powerful motivator for legislators to 
intervene in the formulation of foreign policy.39 The nature of political parties themselves also 
shows that changing the ideological background or disposition of foreign policy views also 
change relative to their political position.40 Control of the White House especially acts as a 
powerful catalyst for political parties, with stronger advocacy for interventionism and 
international engagement strengthening in times when Presidency is under friendly control and 
waning under the opposite.41  
 
34 Lee 2016, 50-51 
35 Lee 2016, 53 
36 Jones 2001, 130 
37 Jones 2001, 137 
38 Jones 2001, 137 
39 Milner and Tingley 2015, 16 
40 Lewis 2016, 35 
41 Lewis 2016, 56 
13 
 
Additionally, despite the American public’s suspicious view of an overly powerful executive, 
views on specific examples of executive overreach in domestic and foreign affairs have been 
primarily been viewed through a partisan heuristic.42 This has effectively meant that the 
traditional political debate on the separation of powers have become subsumed into issues of 
partisan conflict.43 These preexisting biases are likely to continue effect American political 
activity as voters have increasingly sorted themselves into social groupings aligned with their 
preexisting political views.44  This has meant that voter exposure to foreign policy has 
increasingly become aligned with party behavior.45 
Thus, increased partisanship may mean that a President may not only lack a carte blanche but 
may face strong legislative scrutiny while pursuing administration goals. Already, President’s 
have shown a propensity to pursue executive agreements in times when doing so advances the 
foreign priorities of their presidency.46 Such efforts are unlikely to go unnoticed by Congress 
which may seek to strip the balance away from the Presidency or display a degree of autonomy 
from executive pressure. Taking into account the recent trends moving away from a prolonged or 
major Congressional majority, this means that such grandstanding efforts may sap the Presidency 
the political inertia necessary to pursue its unilateral objectives. Thus, the President may take a 
cautious view on pursuing foreign policy. However the President still has ample strength to 
respond to cases of divided government or a cautious legislature through the significant powers 
granted in the executive branch.  
 
42 Christenson and Kilner 2017, 347 
43 Christenson and Kilner 2017, 335 
44 Messing and Westwood 2012, 1056 and Kertzer, Zeitoff 2017 
45 Kertzer, Zeitoff 2017, 335 
46 Caruson and Farrar-Meyers 2007, 643 
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Executive Branch:  
Literature pertaining to the executive branch is primarily divided between the paradigm 
of the personalized Presidency and of the institutional power of the President.47 The personalized 
view of the Presidency was primarily advanced by Richard Neustadt, arguing that the 
Presidency’s power derives from the prestige of the office and the President’s ability to convince 
the separate branches of government to legislate or act on behalf of the administration.48 Two 
major assumptions that the personalized Presidency advances is the view that each Presidency 
will undertake certain administration goals to advance their prestige – and thus their power.49 
Additionally, the view of the personalized Presidency assumes that the President’s ability to 
pressure the differing branches of government resides in the Presidency’s appeal to the American 
public.50 Certainly, many of the tenets of the personalized Presidency have been proven 
consistent in further research. For example, the President’s ability to appeal to the public, an 
ability granted through the prestige of the office, has been shown to be effective in spurring 
Congress to legislate on issues at hand.51 However such views do not fully explain the role of 
executive orders in pressuring Congress to legislate the President’s agenda.52 Additionally, the 
idea of public prestige of the Presidency is extremely consequential in the era of partisan 
polarization. If mobilizing competition against the rival party is the norm, then it implies that a 
large segment of the United States population will not respond well to the President’s unilateral 
ability to act. 
 
47 Howell 2003, 175 
48 Neustadt 1990, 4 
49 Neustadt 1990, 68 
50 Neustadt 1990, 70 
51 Belco and Rottinghaus 2017, 15 
52 Belco and Rottinghaus 2017, 20 
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Like Neustadt’s observations on the Presidency, the institutional view of the Presidency agrees 
that each President approaches the office with concrete goals and policy preferences. However, 
the institutional view of the Presidency sees the power of the branch as not only deriving from 
the President’s ability to negotiate administration goals with the legislative and judicial branches 
but through the President’s ability to unilaterally act.53 These unilateral abilities granted to the 
President have allowed the Presidency to execute policy, forcing courts or Congress to create 
legal justification ex post facto.54 Primarily, the Presidency’s unilateral actions have been seen 
through multiple policy instruments – executive orders, national security directives, and 
executive agreements.55 These policy instruments tip the balance further to the executive branch, 
especially when considering the veto authority the President is granted – opening up another 
means of pressuring a dissident legislature.56 
These powers combined have important implications for legislative-executive relations. First, 
with much of the state bureaucracy directly under the purview of the executive branch, the 
President make certain outcomes more likely.57 Additionally, the ability to unilaterally act has 
been enabled the President to further their power as the agenda setter.58 By invoking issues 
crucial towards the Presidency’s success, the President is able to induce Congress to focus their 
attention on issues that they otherwise would ignore.59 This tactic is especially powerful in times 
when foreign policy related issues are perceived to be the most important – with legislation 
aligned with the President receiving up around 10% more votes in Congress regardless of the 
 
53 Howell 2003, 14 
54 Howell 2003, 14 
55 Howell 2006, 16 
56 Howell 2006,175 
57 Mayer 2001, 30 
58 Mayer 2001, 31 
59 Belco and Rottinghaus 2014, 422 
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President’s approval ratings.60 This well of public approval feeds into the President’s ability to 
act as the agenda setter, with the President often using foreign policy initiatives to advance his 
stature.61 
The ability of the President to move policy at Congress’s expense has numerous implications for 
foreign policy. One, is the ability of the Presidency to continue his or her policy preferences 
regardless of the ideological makeup of Congress. One such example of this was the enactment 
of the Case Act – a Congressional act mandating the notification of the legislative branch in 
cases of international agreements.62 Despite the existence of such legislation, Presidents have 
shown the ability to finagle the definition of international agreements – arguing that accords or 
arrangements do not mandate legislative notification.63 
Another effect of the President’s ability to execute policy unilaterally is the additional ability of 
the President to stymie legislation hostile to the executive branch by tactically acceding to part of 
Congress’s demands in order to prevent greater legislative reform.64 This ability further tips the 
balance of power in favor of the executive – allowing him or her to prioritize issues brought up 
by partisans – seen by the President more often approving legislation brought by members of his 
own party.65 This phenomena creates an incentive for legislators sharing the party with the 
President to cede the power of interpretation to the President due to the shared goals.66 
 
60 Mack, DeRouen, and Lanoe 2013, 99 
61 Mack, DeRouen, and Lanoe 2013, 99-100 
62 Howell 2003, 104 
63 Howell 2003, 104 
64 Belco and Rottinghaus 2014, 417 
65 Belco and Rottinghaus 2014, 421 
66 Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 18 
17 
 
Additionally, Congress faces a number of the informational and organizational disadvantages in 
relation to rolling back cases of executive overreach.67 First, Congress faces information 
asymmetry in the execution of any legislative workings. In many cases, Congress does not 
maintain the feedback loops to government bureaucracy compared to agency heads or the 
President. Additionally, Congressional access towards legal and subject matter experts have 
played a constraining role in Congresses ability to limit executive interpretation.68 
The Legislative Branch: 
Nevertheless, Congress should not be considered impotent when dealing with foreign 
policy. The disposition of Congress has shown to have a significant effect on the chronological 
order of how the President pursues his or her agenda.69 As a result, the President often avoids 
pursuing explicit legislation during his or her lame-duck periods or when seeking reelection.70 
Thus, despite structural and political weaknesses, Congress has been effective in forcing the 
Presidency’s hand in foreign policy. With explicit Constitutional authority vesting the Senate 
with the power of advice and consent, the Senate is able to approve treaties the President has 
made. This gives the Senate, and Congress as a whole, the ability to influence a President’s 
foreign policy. Especially in areas where treaty contents are considered politically controversial, 
the Senate can pressure the Presidency. One method that the Senate can do this is by delaying the 
ratification of the treaty itself.71 This ensures that the ratification of the treaty will not receive a 
vote on the floor until a future Congress decides to either withdraw the treaty from consideration 
 
67 Mayer 2001, 11 
68 Bolton and Thrower 2016, 661 
69 Mack, DeRouen, and Lanoe 2013, 79 
70 Mack, DeRouen, and Lanoe 2013, 98-99 
71 Prins and Marshall 2009, 191 
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or decides to place the treaty to a vote.72 Another way the Senate can pressure the President is to 
add policy stipulations on the treaty ratification documents.73 These stipulations can either limit 
the scope of the treaty, force the President to reconfirm certain aspects of the treaty, or explicit 
amendments to the treaty itself.74 Regardless, both methods effectively forces the President to 
change key elements of the treaty.75 Surprisingly, this effect seems the greatest in issues 
regarding national security – with all of George Bush’s treaties seeing significant alteration in the 
Senate.76  
The dynamic of Senate purview of Presidentially proposed treaties also has given the Legislative 
branch the ability to stymie the executive branch – even when Congress is overall polarized.77 In 
the polarized Obama administration, an ideologically hostile Senate has meant that the Obama 
Presidency has submitted about 4 treaties a year compared with the average of 12 treaties 
submitted during the Bush era.78 
Congress’s ability to withhold or delay formal treaty ratification is not the only method of 
legislative control. Because of Congress’s legislative powers, Congress can determine the extent 
of the executive branch’s authority to interpret its laws.79 Primarily, this can be accomplished by 
the specificity of the law, leaving little room for a potential bureaucrat to interpret how to 
enforce what Congress has enacted.80 On one hand, delegation has many advantages. By leaving 
room for interpretation, Congress need not spend time on writing overly specific laws to focus on 
 
72 Auerswald and Maltzman 2003, 1099 
73 Auerswald and Maltzman 2003, 1099 
74 Auerswald and Maltzman 2003, 1099 
75 Prins and Marshall 2009, 204 
76 Prins and Marshall 2009, 209 
77 Peake, Krutz, and Hughes 2012, 1313 
78 Peake, Krutz, and Hughes 2012, 1299 
79 Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 18 
80 Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 47 
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electoral activities.81 Additionally, the complexity of any given situation means that to a certain 
extent it is advantageous to allow departments with the necessary expertise and knowledge of the 
situation at hand to freely deal with problems as they see fit.82 Congress thus addresses this 
through a logical calculation of politics – although it is better to delegate interpretation to the 
executive, it is worse to do delegate to an executive that is ideologically hostile.83 Thus, Congress 
will tend to restrict the executive’s ability to interpret laws when the two are not ideologically 
aligned or during periods of divided government.84 
Furthermore, Congress’s legal authority has meant that unilateral orders promulgated by the 
executive branch must often share legal precedent.85 Thus, executive promulgations must fit 
inside an overall context that Congress shares a role in creating.86 This limitation has often made 
President’s more cautious when arguing for their ability to act unilaterally – lest a court rules the 
President’s orders unconstitutional and further constraining the executive.87 
Congress’ immense power has had a number of effects on the ways President’s pursue powers 
and thus achieve policy success. First, President’s will tailor their administration priorities based 
upon the legislation they are faced with in order to maximize their chance for success.88 Thus, in 
times of divided government Presidents are more likely to focus on issues their party is perceived 
to have an advantage in while seeking to pressure their cross-party rivals on during periods of 
united government.89 Perhaps most relevantly, in times of political polarization, Presidents tend 
 
81 Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 27 
82 Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 7-27 
83 Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 232 
84 Epstein and O’Halloran 1999 7 & 233 
85 Rottinghaus and Meyer 2007, 340 
86 Rottinghaus and Meyer 2007, 342 
87 Howell 2003, 177 
88 Cummins 2010, 402 
89 Cummins 2010, 402-403 
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to seek competition with their party rivals by competing on the issues their rivals traditionally 
uphold.90 While this in and of itself does not guarantee a show down over foreign policy, it does 
raise questions on how Congress or a Presidency would react when a party seeks to improve their 
standing through a foreign policy break through. 
Conclusion: 
Political polarization will dramatically shape the way any President will pursue their 
foreign policy. While President’s may be able to influence key members of their political party, 
the dynamics of political polarization mean that members of the opposite party have a strong 
incentive to oppose the President’s agenda. Furthermore, since this disagreement is motivated on 
highlighting differences to the voting public, it stands to reason that there is a larger incentive to 
disagree with the President when the administration has staked its success in a certain policy 
agenda. This in effect means that Presidents are likely to shield key aspects of their foreign 
policy from legislative purview whenever possible lest it ends up defeated in the legislature. 
Overall, the main result of political polarization throughout the United States will lead to a 
significant weakening of the credibility of the United States. As research has shown, treaties 
derive their significance not necessarily through legal ratification, but through signaling the 
common commitment American political leaders have towards an issue.91 Thus, foreign policy 
derived without the any bipartisan or treaty mechanism may imply either a lack of commitment 
amongst the American political elite or the significant presence of American politicians that do 
not share the same views. This perceived lack of commitment combined with raucous domestic 
political debate may encourage foreign allies to hedge their diplomacy with the United States in 
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the chance that a different minded Congress or administration is elected. This phenomena will be 
more likely in situations where the President pursues his foreign policy through executive orders 
or agreements due to the ease a future administration could negate such an agreement and the 
lack of bipartisan support executive orders or agreements may have had. 
In the long term, debates on executive unilateralism will likely bring up renewed debates on the 
true bipartisan nature of the United States’ foreign policy and the antiquated nature of being 
pursued. Advocates of executive unilateralism are likely to source Congress’ decreased capacity 
to legislate due to political polarization while cynics of the executive branch are likely to 
advocate for a bipartisan agreement on American foreign policy or simplified measures to ratify 
treaties. 
NAFTA and the JCPOA: 
Since the rise of polarized divided government in 1994, two of the most prominent 
legislative-executive agreements are NAFTA and the JCPOA. To note, both agreements had 
large differences. While NAFTA was seen as a key component of the Clinton foreign policy, the 
treaty primarily addressed economic issues. On the other hand, the JCPOA addressed national 
security considerations and was a political agreement that received numerous attempts by the 
legislature to either stifle the agreement or allow the agreement to remain in effect. In addition, 
NAFTA was a trilateral agreement made between an emerging democracy (Mexico) and a long 
time US ally (Canada). This stands in contrast to Iran which on top of its authoritarian 
government has maintained a contentious relationship between the United States. Nevertheless, 
such differences do not invalidate a comparison between both treaties. First, both agreements 
represent political agreements made between the legislative and executive branches that greatly 
defined both Presidencies when enacted. In both agreements, both Presidents Clinton and Obama 
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had faced large political opposition and played an active role in convincing rivals to allow such 
agreements to pass through Congress. This effort thus allows us to gauge how polarized the 
legislature was in regards to the President’s foreign policy. Second, the comparison to the 
JCPOA and NAFTA is adequate due to two reasons – timing and method. First, while other 
executive legislative agreements or political agreements such as the formation of NATO or the 
termination of the Barbary Wars may be more similar to the JCPOA due to their national security 
implications, enaction of such legislation occurred far before the modern era of political 
polarization, thus making them unsuitable to measure the increased polarization of foreign 
policy. Since, the era of polarization largely began in 1994 then, only foreign policy executive 
legislative agreements occurring during the Clinton era onwards could satisfy the issue of 
timing.92 And while the notable example of the Iraq War does also serve as a seminal foreign 
policy enacted under legislative-executive agreement, support for the war enjoyed bipartisan 
support and thus was quickly enacted. These qualifications mean that despite the difference of 
substance between each agreement, a comparison between NAFTA and the JCPOA are more 
suitable than initially thought. 
Thus, this paper begins by examining the nature of the Clinton administration’s rise before 
examining the process of NAFTA’s ratification. By examining the passage of NAFTA as a 
legislative-executive agreement during the beginning of the polarized era , we will see that 
opposition to NAFTA was primarily issues based. This meant that support and criticism for the 
treaty was found across party lines.  
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For the Obama administration, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is examined. This 
political agreement was made to prevent Iran from gaining the capability to create nuclear 
weapons. However, despite the signing by President Obama, there was little bipartisan consensus 
on the deal, with the Republican Party unsuccessfully attempting to scrap the deal. This meant 
that while the deal came into affect, it was viewed as illegitimate by most Republican elected 
officials. This meant that relative to NAFTA, the JCPOA had a greater likelihood of being 
overturned in the following administration. 
NAFTA: 
Ronald Reagan had shifted political discourse significantly, moving the country away 
from the previously dominant New Deal Coalition and energizing an ascendant conservative 
wing of the Republican Party.93 Reagan’s 8 years in office and the election of George HW Bush 
following his term meant that the Clinton had won a national upset against a Republican 
incumbent. In large part, Clinton’s success represented a shift in political messaging away from 
previous Democratic consensus, arguing for more market friendly forms of economic policy and 
a reshaping of the American welfare system.94 Nevertheless, while Clinton lead the Democratic 
Party to electoral victory, this did not meant that he enjoyed complete dominance over it. 
Throughout the Democratic Primary, Clinton faced stiff opposition from more traditional liberals 
amongst the party and was delivered the Democratic nomination in large part due to his 
perceived electability vis a vis George HW Bush.95 This meant that the Clinton administration 
faced a dilemma wherein the Clinton’s administration’s perceived interests were not necessarily 
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aligned with many others in the Democratic Party. One area that this was notable was in the 
economy. 
Throughout the election campaign, President Clinton used the phrase “It’s the economy stupid” – 
meaning that a President’s support hinged on his ability to deliver economic prosperity to the 
American people. As part of this economic agenda, the Clinton administration proposed a slew 
of reforms to the welfare state – ranging from the earned income tax credit (EITC) to other broad 
federal deregulations. For many on the Democratic Party, aspects of these reforms were 
controversial as they often belied the assumptions that the Reagan administration belied on the 
state’s role in the American public. And one area in particular that bothered some on the 
Democratic Party was Clinton’s proposed trade measures. Throughout the Reagan 
administration, Republican officials floated the idea of a free trade agreement between Mexico, 
Canada, and the United States. Doing so would arguably stabilize the Mexican economy and 
open up a growing market for American manufactured and agricultural goods. Nevertheless, 
many Democratic Congressman did not buy into this argument. For many Democratic 
Congressman, signing such an agreement would allow cheaply produced goods to flood the 
American market and could cause an exodus of skilled labor jobs from leaving the country.96 
Such line of thinking was especially supported by the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) a union organization that disproportionately 
supported the Democratic Party.97 This meant that many Democratic Party members that were 
considered marginal districts were less likely to vote for NAFTA. 
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Nevertheless, while the Clinton administration faced skepticism, enthusiasm for a free trade 
agreement remained generally high amongst the Republican Party. This was due to a number of 
reasons. First was the history of NAFTA itself. While it was the Clinton administration that had 
sought to pass the bill through Congress, it was first proposed during the George HW Bush 
administration who had sought to build off of the Reagan administration’s desire for closer 
economic relations between the two countries.98 This greatly complicated the ability of the 
Republican Party to oppose the deal since George HW Bush had prominently campaigned for 
NAFTA throughout his reelection campaign.99 Besides ideological reasons, the Republican Party 
had a number of political considerations to consider when weighing in whether to support or 
oppose the deal. Unlike the Democratic Party, a key constituency of the Republican Party – the 
business sector had come out in favor of the deal, arguing that NAFTA would open a key market 
to trade.100 Especially vocal in their favor were companies with figures such as Lee Iacocca who 
although had traditionally been supportive of Republican politicians came out in vocal favor of 
NAFTA’s ratification.101 
Besides the risk of alienating the traditional Republican support base, Republicans increasingly 
believed that opposition was a political dead end. In great deal this was because opposition 
towards the bill came in large part from the Democratic Party with key Democratic figures 
estimating up to 2/3rds of Democrats voting against the bill. Thus, Republicans would not 
necessarily need to oppose the Clinton administration for the Clinton administration to suffer a 
stern rebuke. Furthermore, pockets of opposition to NAFTA were concentrated amongst 
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constituencies that the Republican Party held little appeal too or were stuck on the fringe – 
notably amongst the Congressional Black Caucus and Ralph Nader or Pat Buchanan.102 This 
meant when NAFTA finally came to a vote, the Republican Party came to view the vote as a 
non-issue and was willing to lend its support.103 
As a result, voting rolls for NAFTA were surprisingly unpartisan – NAFTA passed the House of 
Representatives with 234 votes – eight more votes necessary required to pass the bill into law.104  
Figure 1: 
 Democrats Republicans Independents 
Yes 102 132 0 
No 156 42 1 
Percentage of Party 
voting in affirmative 
39.5% 75.42% 0% 
 
With a decisive passage in the House, the bill was shortly taken towards a Senate confirmation 
where it received a vote. Passage was similar, with Republicans more likely to vote for the bill 
than Democrats. 
Figure 2: 
 Democrats Republicans 
Yes 27 34 
No 28 10 




Additionally, President Clinton was willing to work against the wishes of his own party to pass 
NAFTA – even telling Republicans in mixed districts that he would personally repudiate 
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arguments against NAFTA.105 Finally, the process of Clinton’s decision to ratify NAFTA most 
likely acted as a stopper for the possibility of Republican criticism.  
JCPOA: 
While the Clinton administration was elected based in many ways off of revisiting 
Republican rhetoric, the election of President Barrack Obama represented a repudiation of the 
previous Bush administration. In his domestic policy, President Obama argued against the 
perceived excesses of the Bush administration’s deregulation and argued for greater equity inside 
the country’s economy. Likewise, in his foreign policy Obama argued for American engagement 
in the world and a greater focus towards a multilateral foreign policy.106 As part of this agenda, 
Obama argued for a rethinking of the Bush administration’s foreign policy that presupposed the 
use of military force in favor of limited engagement with rival powers.  
Obama’s Middle Eastern foreign policy was thus challenged with the discovery of Iranian 
enrichment of uranium. Beginning in 2010, the United States and Israel begin to become 
suspicious of Iranian facilities enriching uranium – something that could lead to Iran acquiring 
nuclear weapons and greatly destabilizing the Middle East. The Obama administration viewed 
such a possibility as unacceptable. The possibility of a pinpoint strike against Iranian nuclear 
facilities was briefly considered but was quickly ruled out due to the high risks such a strike 
entailed and the small chance of success it held.107  
With a purely military option seeming unlikely, Congress followed by the Obama administration 
began a series of sanctions aimed at cutting the Iranian economy off from the rest of the world.108 
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However while the sanctions campaign placed a high cost on the Iranian economy, it was unable 
to directly stop the nuclear crisis from continuing. Thus, the Obama administration began a series 
of negotiations with the Iranian government. 
After multiple years of negotiations, the Obama administration was successful in striking a 
political agreement with Iran, the JCPOA. In this deal, the United States would release funds 
frozen inside the United States back to Iranian banks. In return, Iran conceded to a number of 
inspections by the IAEA.109  
While the JCPOA was signed by the United States and Iran as a political agreement, the scope of 
the agreement meant that many viewed the stipulations of the agreement should fall under a 
treaty.110 In response, Senator Bob Corker introduced legislation, the Iran Nuclear Deal Review 
Act, that would allow Congress to certify, decertify the agreement, or choose to do nothing 
(which would allow the Obama administration to proceed with implementing the JCPOA).111 
However, while Congress overwhelmingly approved of placing Congressional approval of the 
deal, support for the deal was split amongst Party lines. For while some Democrats remained 
demure on their support of the agreement, the most vociferous opposition came from the rival 
Republican Party who argued that the agreement was an example of political weakness of the 
Obama administration.112 
Republican opponents of JCPOA had numerous ideological reasons to oppose the bill. The 
outgoing George Bush administration labelled the regime as part of an Axis of Evil and sought to 
isolate the country from the rest of the world. Furthermore, Republican lawmakers argued that 
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due to Iran’s previous support for terrorist groups and its anti-American policies, allowing the 
Iranian government access to international credit would embolden the regime.113 Iran’s hostile 
rhetoric towards Israel also acted as a lightning rod for Republican support due to Israeli support 
being a core value of the current Republican Party.114  
Besides an ideological suspicion against Iranian efforts, Republican suspicion of the Obama 
administration’s outreach towards Iran also had a strong political dimension. Throughout the 
Obama administration, Republican politicians had implicitly argued against that the 
administration was overly friendly to Islamic nations and was weak-willed on national security 
threats.115 This meant that regardless of the JCPOA’s merits, Republican support for the deal 
began as a non-starter. 
The first attempts at preventing the JCPOA from coming into affect was a strong Republican 
campaign to use the Iran Nuclear Deal Review Act to decertify the agreement. Although doing 
so would take a Congressional supermajority to overturn the agreement, such efforts nonetheless 
began in the earnest by Republican Senator Tom Cotton who sent an open letter to the Iranian 
government noting that the agreement was not supported by the Republican Party with 49 
Republican Senators cosigning the Statement.116 
The ensuing vote came into Congress in the summer of 2015. Leading up to the vote, the Obama 
administration took an unprecedented effort to sell the merits of the deal – going as far as to 
campaign and to seek endorsements from former national security officials. Nevertheless, such 
efforts were unable to swing any Congressional Republicans and the House of Representatives, 
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where the Republican Party was the majority decided to vote in three phases. The first vote, 
appropriately titled the “H.Res.411 - Finding that the President has not complied with section 2 
of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015” sought to decertify whether the President 
had correctly transmitted information on the nuclear inspection to Congress.117 The votes came 
down into a party vote with all Republicans voting for the bill and nearly all Democrats voting 
against the resolution.118 
Figure 3: 
Party Democratic Republican 
Yes 0 245 
No 186 0 
Abstain 2 0 
Percentage of Party with caucus 98.94% 100% 
 
Simultaneous to the passage of the Resolution, Republican House members then sought to 
prevent funds that the sanctions had released from being reclaimed by Iranian institutions 
through another vote.119  
Figure 4: 
Party Democratic Republican 
Yes 2 245 
No 186 0 
Abstain 0 0 




Finally, the House Republicans introduced resolution to nullify the deal altogether. This attempt 
was slightly more successful – gaining 25 House Democrats voting in the affirmative.120 
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Party Democratic Republican 
Yes 25 244 
No 162 0 
Abstain 0 1 
Percentage of Party with caucus 86.63% 99.6% 
 
These votes, while a stern rebuke from House Republicans, were not sufficient to end the 
JCPOA. Thus, Senate Republicans, the minority party, introduced legislation that would voice 
Senate disapproval of the JCPOA.121 In response, the Democratic majority launched a filibuster 
of the legislation. This lead to a a purely party line vote with a majority to small too overturn the 
deal.122 
Figure 6: 
Party Democratic Republican 
Yes 1 52 
No 45 0 
Abstain 0 2 




As a result of the Democratic filibuster, the Republican Party moved to vote on cloture for the 
filibuster.123 And while this vote received relatively more Democratic votes than the previous, 
Democrats overwhelmingly voted against ending the filibuster and the overall vote fell well short 
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Party Democratic Republican 
Yes 4 0 
No 42 42 




This meant that despite vociferous Republican denouncements, the JCPOA would remain into 
effect – something that would irk Republicans moving into the next election.124  
Conclusion: 
A look comparative review of the passage of NAFTA and the JCPOA shows the 
increased partisanship amongst foreign policy. While NAFTA was able to quickly gain 
Republican support, the JCPOA was consistently viewed as contentious. This is for many 
reasons. First, NAFTA already had strong Republican support prior to the Clinton 
administration’s decision to proceed with NAFTA’s confirmation. Thus, the Clinton 
administration spent as much time convincing other Democrats as it did with convincing 
Republicans to support the bill.125 Clinton’s support for NAFTA also belies another fact – that a 
President’s political party did not have as great effect on his foreign policy positions than it 
would later hold. On the converse, the Obama administration in many ways repudiated key 
aspects of the Bush administration’s involvement in the Middle East, conducting limited 
outreach to Iran – something that would not have likely happened during the previous 
administration. 
While President Obama likely sought bipartisan support, he was unable to bring bipartisan 
support for JCPOA. In Obama’s case, previous Republican attacks had honed in on perceived 
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weakness towards Islamic extremism and argued that negotiations with the Iranian government 
would embolden the Iranian military.126 Due to JCPOA fitting well with the Republican narrative 
against the Obama administration, the agreement was publicly panned by multiple Republican 
Senators and was often mentioned in repudiating the policies of the Obama administration.127 
This resulted in the JCPOA being signed as a political agreement between the two governments. 
Overall, the results of political polarization on the President’s ability to conduct foreign affairs 
are undeniable. In the past, the President had little to gain from possibly alienating Congress by 
unilaterally executing foreign affairs, however in modern days this seems the case – especially in 
times of divided government. Thus, as political polarization increases, we are likely to see high-
profile foreign affairs become held together by unilateral executive orders. This in turn brings up 
a large question to consider – if the United States is unable to create domestic agreement on its 
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The New START Treaty – Changing Views Over Time 
 
The Obama administration came into power explicitly calling for a reset in relations with Russia 
and a greater focus on counter-proliferation as a key administration goal. Such priorities led to an 
eventual ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 2010 between the 
United States and Russia which significantly reduced the number of nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems held by both countries.  
Surprisingly, the Obama administration was able to win bipartisan support for the ratification of 
the treaty, with 13 Republican Senators voting with the Democratic majority. Yet, bipartisan 
support for the treaty has eroded over time. The Trump administration sought to allow the treaty 
to expire with significant Republican support for that position. 
This chapter examines the conditions that allowed the New START treaty to be ratified, despite 
increased political polarization, and examine the change of sentiments amongst the Republican 
Party. The key to this shift has been a changing Republican Party whose growing ideological 
preference for unilateralism is consistent with decreased support for treaties that could restrict 
United States military capabilities.  In addition, increasingly Republicans have as a message 
theme to combat perceived Democratic weakness.. 
This has key effects on the future of treaty ratification in the United States. Specifically, it means 
that the scope of issues that can be ratified through an official treaty will significantly decrease 
and that Presidents will have to possibly  rely upon  less powerful legal mechanisms. 
Denuclearization Prior to the Obama Administration 
Since the creation of nuclear weapons, American presidents have all pursued counter-
proliferation to various degrees of success and importance. Modern counterproliferation efforts 
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first emerged under then-President Truman whose proposed Baruch Plan which would solidify 
the control of nuclear technology development and ore extraction under a proposed International 
Atomic Development Authority. The IADA would then be charged with allowing the peaceful 
spread of nuclear technology while mandating the production of atomic weapons and eventual 
denuclearization of all states.128 While the plan was never ratified under Soviet objections, the 
basic principles set in the Baruch Plan would guide further American efforts at counter-
proliferation.129 
The next major step towards counterproliferation efforts would occur in the Eisenhower 
administration. Understanding that outright denuclearization was likely to be unsuccessful, the 
Eisenhower administration sought nuclear reduction by accounting for fissile material and 
encouraging the use peaceful development of nuclear technology. Through the development of 
nuclear technology, the amount of fissile material eligible for nuclear weapons production would 
be concurrently reduced.130  
While the Eisenhower administration’s Atoms for Peace efforts brought greater prominence to 
American efforts at counterproliferation, it was Eisenhower’s predecessors that would formulate 
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – arguably the most thorough of all proliferation treaties. In 
this treaty, all nuclear armed nations would pledge to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons or 
technology that could lead to their creation while non-nuclear countries pledged to abstain from 
developing their own arsenals.131 Perhaps surprisingly, the NPT was introduced to the United 
Nations simultaneously by the United States and Soviet who both had concluded extensive 
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negotiations prior to the introduction and believed that joint ratification would preserve both 
countries influence and organize geopolitical competition within the ongoing Cold War.132 
Perhaps as surprising as the collaboration between the two superpowers was the lack of domestic 
controversy the treaty brought. Within Senate hearings, contemporary sources noted a lack of 
any objections – a point brought home by the then campaigning Nixon whose seeming objections 
were based off the timing of when the deal was signed, rather than the substance of the deal 
itself.133 And while conservative firebrand and future presidential candidate Senator Goldwater 
argued against the treaty, such criticisms held little regard with other Republican leaders. 134 The 
treaty thus was signed into law by the newly elected President Nixon who firmly believed in the 
psychological impact that the NPT gave and noted that counterproliferation efforts would not 
adversely impact US security interests.135 
Despite the signing of the NPT, significant security concerns remained over proliferation. While 
the NPT addressed President’s concerns over other countries nuclearization, the NPT did not 
significantly address the growing armaments between the two major superpowers – the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, while the Nixon administration sought limited détente 
with the Soviet Union, the danger of nuclear war remained. Thus, the Nixon administration 
sought to negotiate a bilateral agreement between both states which would put a limit to the 
growing arms race. This led to the beginning of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
(SALT). In this agreement, both nations proposed concrete limitations on the number of 
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and a freeze on the creation of more silos. To 
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note, the first SALT agreement left large parts of both countries arsenals outside of its purview. 
For example, such neogiations did not stop the proliferation of multiple warhead ballistic 
missiles. Nevertheless, the treaty remained groundbreaking in a strong sense – with the signing 
of the SALT, an American President concretely established the tying of counterproliferation as a 
condition necessary for greater détente. 
Despite a growing conservative base, the toll of Watergate propelled Democrat Jimmy Carter to 
the presidency – and with it brought a more liberal approach to American foreign policy and 
denuclearization. Carter, who sought greater alignment with America’s professed beliefs and its 
foreign policy prioritized human rights and a greater emphasis on nuclear weapons control.136 In 
this, Carter began to negotiate the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) which would 
significantly reduce ICBM and warhead stockpiles between the Soviet Union and the United 
States.137 Carter begun his denuclearization efforts by looking at the Vladivostok Agreement – 
signed by Ford. Although not an official treaty, the Ford government left a series of four 
principles (an upper limit on nuclear delivery vehicles and launchers, limit on the number of 
silos, and an understanding how to quantify long ranged bombers) that remained unsigned and 
not yet negotiated to a formal agreement.138 Thus, the Carter administration forged ahead with 
these principles to negotiate SALT II.  
In 1979, negotiations between the two countries lead to the signing of SALT II by the Soviet 
Union and the United States.139 In the treaties, both countries pledged to limit the size of their 
ICBM arsenals, refrain from converting or modernizing large parts of their existing arsenals, 
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adding limits on payload sizes, banning the construction of new silos, and refraining from 
developing more advanced nuclear delivery systems.140 Nevertheless while the treaty addressed 
one of the most grave sources of tension between the two states, the treaty was not immune to 
ongoing developments in the Cold War and Congressional ratification was delayed by Jimmy 
Carter in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.141 
Lacking Congressional approval, the fate of the SALT II treaty looked up in the air – especially 
given the incoming President Reagan’s stated suspicions.142 Of particular concern to the Reagan 
administration was the increasing Soviet buildup of intermediate nuclear range missiles 
throughout Europe. For Reagan, this buildup would severely degrade the balance of power in 
Europe and would hand the Soviet Union a decisive advantage in military affairs.143  Thus, the 
Reagan administration pursued a three-pronged initiative. First, was the buildup of American 
missile defense capabilities – hoping to erode the Soviets perceived missile superiority.144 
Secondly, was a commitment to uphold existing treaties between the two countries, arguing the 
United States would only withdraw when it became clear the Soviet Union had discarded the 
treaty itself.145 
The final pillar in the Reagan administration’s Reagan’s cautious support for denuclearization 
would lead to further negotiations with the Soviet Union. At the Icelandic capital of Rekyajvik, 
an initially unsuccessful summit lead to the greater negotiation which culminated in the 
Intermediate Nuclear Range Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Breathtaking in its ambition, the treaty 
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marked the first time the United States and Soviet Union would jointly reduce existing nuclear 
stockpiles and created enforcement mechanisms to ensure both countries were in compliance.146 
Such measures received overwhelming bipartisan support – following its introduction to 
Congress, it was ratified with 95 votes for approval.147 
Reagan’s successor George HW Bush saw the last major expansion of counterproliferation. 
Although the Reagan administration had signed the INF Treaty, the signing of the treaty alone 
did not end the concern of nuclear proliferation and both sides sought to further reduce the 
possibility of nuclear war.148 Thus, the Gorbachev and Bush administrations agreed to the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement – a treaty that would reduce both nation’s 
nuclear arsenal by 35% and would remain in effect for 20 years before needing to be 
renegotiated.149 However, while the treaty was ratified by large margins in the Senate, the treaty 
faced a massive surprise – the Soviet Union collapsed. 
Political Polarization 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States had lost its foremost 
geopolitical rival. Thus, counterproliferation efforts began to take a declining profile amongst 
President’s profile. Nevertheless, radical changes were underway in American politics. 
Beginning in the 1980s, America’s legislative politics began to undergo a profound change. 
Since the election of Franklin Roosevelt, the Democratic Party held a majority in both houses of 
Congress.150 However, the balance of power was beginning to shift. The Reagan Presidency had 
left a profound mark on the previous Republican Party, shifting the party from a content, 
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ideologically diverse, minority party to a Party that whose conservative wing was rapidly 
becoming ascendant.151 Thus, in consecutive elections, the Republican Party began to slowly 
gain seats amongst the House of Representatives until in 1994 a miracle happened – the 
Republican Party gained the House and Senate.152  
With the new majority, the Republican Party intended to change American politics. Led by the 
newly minted Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, the new House Majority sought to usher in 
conservative legislation while playing an offensive form of politics wherein Republican support 
would be won by seeking conflict with the Democratically held White House.153 These political 
conflicts would then be used to build up support amongst the Republican voter base – which in 
theory would increase a Republican majority. In many respects, this campaign was broadly 
successful – as the increase in Republican support meant that majorities held by either 
Republicans and Democrats henceforth were often slim – and thus could feasibly be overturned 
in the next election.154 
This new electoral strategy was helped in many ways. First was the increasing sorting of voters 
between the two parties. For the Republican side, support was overwhelmingly held amongst 
white voters and an increasingly strong convergence on small government philosophy.155 For the 
Democrats on the other hand had to maintain support amongst a more disparate group of 
ethnicities and other social minorities.156 This meant that while the Democratic Party in theory 
could carry a greater share of the vote, this hold on each group was tenuous – as each respective 
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group’s support for the party was conditional. Furthermore, as both groups support solidified, 
cross ticket splitting decreased – effectively meaning that as each party became more sorted, it 
commanded greater loyalty amongst American voters.157 
Besides ideological sorting, the new electoral map showed both parties holding roughly equal 
shares of the geographical regions of the United States.158 For the Democrats, electoral 
dominance was achieved by the coastal regions and shares of the Midwest. On the other hand, 
the political map increasingly showed Republican dominance in the deep South and the 
Midwest.159 What was left was a handful of swing states which would hold the key to electoral 
dominance.160 As a whole, both ideological and geographical sorting meant that while 
Democratic and Republican legislative campaigns could rely on solid bases, these were 
insufficient to achieve an overwhelming political majority.161 Thus, both party had to now ensure 
greater base turnout while simultaneously winning over a shrinking undecided vote. 
This has had a sharp effect in American politics. In the past, both parties remained ideologically 
diverse and relatively split between groups. Now, as both parties have become ideologically 
polarized, both parties now share an equal share of the US voting block. And with the cross party 
splitting growing smaller, this has meant that the path to power for either party now comes from 
rallying their voter base and using greater turnout to win elections. This has profound effect on 
US policy making. For one, elected officials are rewarded by seeking conflict and contrast with 
their opponents. In the past, bipartisanship was seen as a noble ideal and in great effect could 
bring tangible benefits to both parties. Now, with legislative majorities slim and electoral identity 
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based in great part off of contrast with the opposing party, bipartisanship has become a vice – not 
a virtue. 
The electoral competition between both parties now defines legislative-executive relationships. 
Presidents are often seen as agenda setters for the country’s domestic and foreign policy ventures 
and also act as the head of their respective party. Thus, with conflict being encouraged between 
parties, this has made cooperation between the opposition party and the President 
counterproductive. Instead, the opposition party has a strong incentive to oppose Presidential 
initiatives to both gain support amongst their respective voter base and to provide evidence on 
the alleged incompetency of the governing party. This is true in both domestic and foreign affairs 
where domestic legitimation lies within the President’s role as the head of the state.  
The Obama Administration: 
2008 was a historic year in American politics. Leading an ascendant Democratic Party was then 
Illinois Senator Barack Obama whose promise of change catapulted him to the Presidency and 
brought with him both the means and ambition to revamp American domestic and foreign policy. 
While the Obama Presidency remained focused primarily on the ongoing economic crisis, 
President Obama also carried great interest in counterproliferation – a subject that he had 
previously engaged in as a Senator.162 Soon after his inauguration, the Obama administration 
began discussions with the Russian government on renegotiating the START agreement, set to 
expire in 2009.163 These efforts at renegotiating the START treaty aligned with President 
Obama’s greater agenda – a refocus away from American unilateralism and obsession with short 
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term gains along with a greater concern on the image of the United States amongst the global 
public.164 
While the Obama election carried with it an overwhelming Democratic majority, the Obama 
administration also coincided with a period of greater radicalization of the Republican Party. As 
the Democratic Party lost the House in 2010, the Obama administration’s pursuit of arms control 
with Russia became a target in a greater competition between the Republican Party and the 
Democratic administration. While the Obama administration was eventually successful in 
passing the New Start Treaty with 13 Republican votes, such bipartisanship was a far cry from 
the 95-0 vote the arguably more ambitious INF treaty received.  
Almost 10 years later, the fate of the New Start Treaty looks in doubt. The outgoing Trump 
administration argued against a renewal of the treaty and support for greater arms control 
agreements amongst from Republican Senators looks slimmer. Yet how did the pursuit of a 
previously bipartisan issue become so polarizing? 
In great part, this is due to the changing nature of the Republican Party. Out of the 13 Senators 
that have signed the treaty, only one Senator remains in office while the rest have either retired 
or were primaried out of office. 
To demonstrate this, this paper will first review the process of ratification from the Obama 
administration’s initial signing of the treaty to its ratification through the Senate. The paper will 
demonstrate that a decisive factor in winning Republican votes was through great support 
amongst moderate Republican figures – former President George HW Bush and then Senator 
Dick Luger. The paper will then document internal changes amongst the Republican party, 
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leading to the declining influence of such figures and the rise of a more polarized Republican 
Party in its stead. Finally, the paper will review what the effects of such an ideological party will 
have on the future of proliferation and foreign policy efforts. 
The Beginnings of New Start: 
Towards the end of the Bush administration, Russo-American times were the most strained since 
the Cold War. While the Bush administration had begun its term with the goal of greater 
cooperation between the two countries, the Russian invasion of Georgia and the Russian 
government’s sclerotic response to the Color Revolutions in the former Soviet republics 
seriously strained ties between the two countries. With the transition of power between the 
outgoing Republican Bush administration and the incoming Democratic Obama administration, 
Obama aimed to achieve a revamping of ties between the two countries – arguing that common 
ground could be built between both countries.165 In part, Obama’s optimism was based on two 
things. First, the Russian constitution mandated a term limit of two terms for the country’s 
President. This meant that Vladimir Putin, an aggressively nationalist Russian President would 
not be in office. Instead, Putin’s chosen successor, Dmitri Mdevedev, would chart an approach 
that seemed more urbane and thus more amenable to compromise.166 Secondly, was the Obama 
administration’s desire to leverage greater cooperation with Russia to achieve a number of 
separate geopolitical goals – that being the cooperation on Iran and North Korea’s ballistic 
missile programs, cooperation on the War on Terror, and the greater economic reform.167 Finally, 
the Obama administration had explicitly called for greater cooperation on counterproliferation 
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and a long term effort towards complete denuclearization.168 This goals thus necessitated greater 
outreach with Russia. 
The first negotiations between the two countries began during the April 2009 G-20 Summit 
wherein both the United States and Russia pledged to further reduce their nuclear arsenal, to 
negotiate a successor agreement to START, and to work towards global denuclearization.169 
These statements were followed through by both heads of state during the state visit to Russia 
wherein both nations agreed to a reduction of strategic warheads and their delivery systems.170 
While such agreements were wide ranging, such agreements did not constitute an immediate 
treaty between either country.  and in many ways represented a substantial improvement on 
counterproliferation as the treaty increased the stringency of nuclear inspections compared to the 
first START agreement.171 Nevertheless overtures did not immediately reflect a treaty amongst 
either nations as both countries had outstanding issues preventing the signing of a formal treaty. 
However, as negotiations continued throughout 2009, substantial improvement was made 
following a joint statement by both Presidents during the December of the year. This lead to the 
signing of a final treaty during March 26, 2010.172 
Domestic Reactions: 
While previously denuclearization was held as a bipartisan goal the New Start Treaty was 
initially controversial amongst prominent Republican members. Suspected 2012 Presidential 
Republican candidate Mitt Romney argued that the contents of the treaty would be tantamount to 
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placing a veto on US missile deployments to Europe.173 While influential Senator John McCain 
openly stated his suspicions of the treaty due to Russia’s previous geopolitical adventurism.174 
This meant that at the time of the treaty’s announcement only one Republican Senator, Dick 
Luger, openly supported the treaty.175  
Despite Republican suspicions of the New Start Treaty, a degree of Republican support was 
necessary because without 13 Republican votes, the treaty would not be ratified by the Senate. 
Thus, the Obama administration took on two different approaches. The first, was by highlighting 
former Republican officials support for the treaty. For example, former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger testified to Congress the year that the bill was introduced to argue that the treaty would 
enhance stability between the two parties.176 Kissinger was not the only Secretary of State that 
testified in support of the treaty. Nearly every former Secretary of State from both Democratic 
and Republican administrations testified of the importance of the deal – with some like James 
Baker and Condoleezza Rice, both of which served under Republican administrations, explicitly 
stated that the treaty was a continuation of previous conservative administrations.177  
The second tool that the Obama administration held was the moderate Republican vote. While 
the Republican caucus generally was hostile to the treaty, the Republican chairs of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee proved to be more amenable to the treaty. The Republican leader 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar argued that the failure to cut down on 
nuclear arsenals constituted an existential threat to the country and thus needed to be dealt with 
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immediately.178 Thus, Richard Lugar leveraged his position as the most senior Republican 
Senator on foreign relations and actively sought to increase the likelihood of ratification by 
integrating over 15 proposals in the Senate’s resolution of ratification. This allowed different 
critiques by Senators to be integrated in the treaty process and avoid the possibility of the treaty 
being shelved or sent back to the President to be renegotiated.179 Senator Lugar’s negotiations 
between different Senators was also aided by the White House who sought to address Republican 
critiques of New START outside of the treaty itself. For example, the Republican opposition 
argued that the New START agreement would allow Russia to gain nuclear superiority because 
it would prevent the United States from deploying an adequate amount of nuclear weapons. 
Thus, the Obama administration explicitly linked the ratification of New START with the 
modernization of the nuclear force which ameliorated Republican concerns of losing nuclear 
parity with Russia.180 These efforts allowed the New START agreement to pass through the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and thus come to a floor vote.181 Once on the Senate floor, 
the Treaty could be voted amongst all Senate members – a position that favored the Democratic 
Party as the party would only need 9 Republican defections to gain enough votes for 
ratification.182 
Nevertheless, significant Republican disagreement remained over the ratification of the treaty. 
Senator John McCain argued that the treaty could still allow for Russian cheating on nuclear 
tests and thus sought to delay a vote until after the midterm elections and after significant 
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changes to the treaty which would force a renegotiation with Russia.183 However, such efforts did 
not achieve any results. Out of the three amendments proposed, none of them passed due to 
Democratic and moderate Republican opposition.184 With the failure of such amendments, 
Republican opposition soon began to look less effective as 13 Republican Senators, well over the 
amount needed for ratification, announced their support for the bill. Thus, the Treaty was ratified 
on December 22, 2010.185 
New START Over Time: 
The end of the Obama administration ended with the transition of power to Donald Trump – a 
conservative firebrand whose signature line of “America First” called into question previous 
bipartisan held opinions and instead favored American unilateralism as the measure of the 
country’s strength. Furthermore, the Trump administration remained ideologically opposed to 
what it saw as a pernicious liberal influence in Washington and thus sought to dismantle key 
parts of the Obama administration.186 As part of this greater suspicion of multilateral treaties 
came greater suspicion to nuclear arms control. For the Trump administration, security came out 
from the United States preeminent military strength and the President evinced the countries 
nuclear and missile arsenal as a key proponent of such.187 Thus, the Trump administration  
sought to rapidly modernize the United States nuclear arsenal and significantly increased the 
budget to do so.188 It is then unsurprising that the Trump administration was broadly suspicious 
of the New START agreement - arguing that the treaty had allowed Russia to skirt its 
moratorium on nuclear developments and that further nonproliferation efforts would need to 
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include China as well. As a result, the Trump administration sought to allow the New START 
Treaty to expire.189 
Overall, Republican reactions to former President Trump’s decision to allow the Treaty to expire 
was broadly positive. Senator Josh Hawley argued that further proliferation efforts with Russia 
were strategically useless as the United States had already decreased its nuclear arsenal by too 
much. Other Republican heavyweights argued in a similar fashion. Republican Senators Ted 
Cruz and Tom Cotton both introduced Senate Resolutions calling for a complete withdrawal of 
the Open Skies Treaty – a separate treaty with Russia arguing that the latter had failed to live up 
to its obligations other treaties like the New Start.190 And while the Biden administration has 
renewed the New Start Treaty, scant positive support for such extensions have been seen from 
the Republican Party. 
Why is this the case? Partially, this has been caused by dramatic shifts amongst the makeup of 
the Republican Party.  
After all, the New START Treaty was passed through a greater bipartisan vote than initially 
needed. First of all has been the changes related to the renewal of the New START agreement. 
During the ratification process, the Obama administration linked nuclear modernization to the 
ratification process. Such efforts built up Republican confidence in a possible deal with 
Russia.191 However, Republican concerns have increasingly become concerned that Russian 
nuclear weapons capability have come to rival United States capabilities. While this line of 
thinking may hold some explanatory power over the treaty, this does not provide a sufficient 
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explanation of why Republican sentiments have shifted so rapidly. After all, remaining in the 
New START Treaty just as well provides an insurance against Russia for fully committing its 
resources in a second nuclear arms race and by predicting a mechanism to predict the future size 
and posture of the Russian nuclear arsenal.192 Instead, a large reason why the New START 
Treaty has faced less support amongst Republican senators is a stark change in the composition 
of the Republican wing of the Senate. 
Out of the Republican Senators that voted for New START, two out of thirteen Senators remain 
in office. And out of the 11 Senators that left office, four of their seats are currently held by a 
Democratic incumbent, a sign of a greater liberal shift in their respective states (Massacheussetts, 
Georgia, Maine, and New Hampshire). The remaining seven seats though are now occupied by 
conservative Republicans who have much less desire to negotiate with a Democratic 
administration. This polarization can be measured by looking at the party support index – a 
measurement by CQ Congress that tabulates the amount of time that each politician votes in line 
with his or her party. These measurements are taken each year. Represented below are the 
average PSI score measuring from the beginning of each Senator’s respective first term until 
2019, the last date listed on the site. Republican members of the 111th Congress (the term that 
voted in the New START agreement) are compared to the current office holders from the 117th 
Congress (2021-2023) in the figures below. To note, Democratic Senators are PSI measure are 
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Average of 111th Congress PSI Average of 117th Congress PSI 
80.4 88.90 
 
Amongst Republican Senators that voted for the New START, the PSI was 80%. However, 
looking at the current PSI of each respective member the figure increases to 88.9%. This number 
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significantly increases if Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski are omitted from the total (since the 
two are the only remaining Republican Senators that voted for ratification). 
Figure 3: 
Average of 111th Congress PSI Average of 117th Congress PSI (w/out Susan 
Collins and Lisa Murkowski) 
80.4 95.48 
This number increases even higher to 96% if Senators Ben Sasse and Rob Portman are not 
included – as one will not seek reelection and the other currently shares an estranged relationship 
with the Republican National Party. Nevertheless, the results are compelling enough to show a 
clear trend towards Republican polarization caused by a rightward shift amongst the Republican 
voting base and moderate Republican seats being poached by Democrats.  
The trend towards a more ideological Republican Party is also reflected in the composition of its 
Foreign Relations Committee members. During the  ratification process of the New START 
agreement, 4 Republican Senators broke from their party to allow the treaty to be voted on in the 
Senate floor.  However, the prospect of a Republican break on the committee looks less likely 









117th SFCR Member Average PSI Score 
James Risch 97.55 
Marco Rubio 94.44 
Ron Johnson 96.89 
Mitt Romney 97 
Rob Portman 88.78 
Rand Paul 88 
Todd Young 95.33 
John Barrasso 97.23 
Ted Cruz 94.57 
Mike Rounds 95 
Bill Hagerty N/A 
Average PSI Score 94.48 
 
When comparing to the average PSI Scores from the 111th Congress to the current Republican 
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, bipartisanship decreased by over around 
15%, with partisanship of the average Foreign Relations Committee member being akin to the 
more conservative members who replaced previously moderate Republican Senators. Even with 
less conservative members of the Foreign Relations Committee such as Rand Paul (R;KY) or 
Rob Portman (R; OH) stated their concerns with New START.193 Furthermore Mitt Romney, a 
Senator who has built up a relationship of independence vis a vis the national Republican Party –
was outspoken on his disproval of the New START treaty.194 And while a Democratic slim 
majority in both the Foreign Relations Committee would allow new foreign treaties to be voted 
on in the floor, a more ideological Republican Party would ensure a future Democratic 
administration would almost solely rely on Democratic votes. 
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What New START’s Future Means for America’s Future Foreign Relations 
The increased polarization of American politics has meant that the previously bipartisan pursuit 
of arms control has become a political affair. And while, the New START treaty was able to 
muster a ratification process in 2010, the passage of similar legislation looks unlikely. This 
phenomena has implications that reach past the New START agreement or counterproliferation 
agreements themselves. 
One risk that the collapse of the bipartisan consensus around counterproliferation is the phasing 
out of many counterproliferation treaties. Simultaneous to the end of New START was the 
expiration of the INF Treaty, something which the Trump administration allowed to expire.195 
While the Biden administration’s extension of New START has pushed the date treaty’s 
expiration date further in the future, this does not mean treaty expiration has ceased to become a 
worry. In both the INF and New START agreements, both agreements were held to a timeline in 
order to ensure the treaty’s ratification and to ensure that the treaties had kept up with increases 
in nuclear technology. However, with the potential of treaties not being allowed to expire under a 
potentially hostile Congress, this significantly reduces the room of US diplomats to negotiate 
with the treaty and increases the likelihood of countries to view treaties as merely temporary 
measures that may be revisited at a later date. 
Finally, an implication of the New START’s contentious future is the notable rise in 
unilateralism amongst Republican elites. While previous Presidents may have sought a more 
aggressive and unilateral approach to national security, such attitudes did not constitute the sole 
prism in which Presidential administration’s pursued their foreign policy. Rather, Presidents 
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often combined such tactics with more peaceful and multilateral policies that allowed 
geopolitical tensions to be controlled. Even the conservative archetype Reagan tempered his 
competition with the Soviet Union with the INF treaty to great affect. These changes in policy 
preferences amongst a more ideological Republican Party thus may constitute a greater problem 
in time as the strong preference for securing American interests solely through force of arms may 
make it more difficult for the country to cooperate with allied countries and complicate the 
seeking of détente. While critics may note that Republican hardliners may be more amenable to 
treaties if their counterparts ceded more ground, this idea rests on a number of presumptions. 
First, for rival nations to cede more ground on their treaties, said nation must view the lack of a 
treaty as the worst possible outcome. However, in the case of countries like Russia, China, or 
North Korea, such presumptions are not necessarily true. Russia for example has stated its 
willingness to leave treaties like the Open Skies Treaty due to its national interest while China 
has demurred on the benefits of engaging in trilateral arms control.196 This runs in the face of the 
hardline argument that such countries have an intrinsic need to enter in such treaties, regardless 
of what policy outcomes they give up by doing so. Instead, lacking counterproliferation 
agreements has meant that nuclear proliferation has continued with fewer rules between nations, 
greater distrust, and less transparency in what other nations nuclear capabilities are. 
Secondly, hardliners presumption that a better deal could somehow be reached is contentious at 
best. Negotiations with Russia lasted over a year with direct negotiations conducted by President 
Obama. Furthermore, proliferation negotiations in general had preceded the Obama 
administration by decades. This brings up the question of why a greater deal was possible in the 
first place. After all, the Bush administration immediately preceding the Obama administration 
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had engaged in in negotiations over Russia’s nuclear armaments but was unsuccessful in 
formulating a treaty. Thus, New START was likely the best agreement that the United States 
could have achieved with Russia during that time. 
Conclusion 
Since the beginning of the nuclear age, proliferation has been a bipartisan concern for both 
Presidents and Congress. Thus, nuclear treaties were routinely signed by both Democratic and 
Republican Presidents. However, America’s political polarization has ended this. This greatly 
explains the sudden reversal of the New START deal which was ratified by bipartisan consensus 
during the Obama administration, but was almost left to expire during the Trump administration. 
Polarization has meant that the Republican Party has become more unilateral while moderate 
members that would be more likely to support bipartisan pursuits of arms control have left office. 
This does not bode well for American diplomacy in the future as unilateralism itself has limited 
capacity to force nations to accede to countries demands and as hypothetical better deals are 








US-DPRK Relations and Political Polarization 
1. Introduction:   
Political polarization has greatly complicated the President’s ability to pursue the policy of 
détente. This phenomenon is readily apparent in the Clinton administration’s fore in negotiations 
with North Korea. Beginning in 1992, North Korea’s rapid progress on uranium enrichment lead 
to a series of negotiations that froze large swathes of the North Korean program. Despite the 
progress, the Clinton administration was unable to unify a hostile Republican Congress and thus 
struggled to deliver on American promises of aid. With the transition to the Bush administration, 
the progress made was soon abandoned and North Korean successfully detonated its first nuclear 
weapon. 
The Clinton administration’s experience is a useful example for future studies in North Korean 
affairs and foreign policy in general. Future administrations, like the Clinton administration, will 
face domestic constraint from opposition parties and President’s will have to negotiate balancing 
US interests with domestic politics. Furthermore, the unpopular nature of détente with a hostile 
regime will means that Presidents may have to pursue such policies through executive orders. 
This opens the possibility of reversal by a future administration. This is especially true in North 
Korea’s case because the country’s unsympathetic position amongst the American public makes 
it an easy subject to criticize. Additionally, the lack of progress and high profile of such 
endeavors makes it an area ripe for criticism and symbolic dismantlement when changing 
administrations. This dynamic has been noticed by DPRK negotiators and diplomats who have 
sought to either wait out administration initiatives or have used the possibility of a foreign policy 




In addition, while normal foreign relations are often stabilized through third parties such as 
business communities or immigrant communities, US-DPRK relations are unlikely to develop 
such stabilizers and thus may be subject to greater fluctuation based upon the prevailing political 
sentiment. This ensures that US policy towards the DPRK will remain fundamentally tense, with 
legislation enacted by Congress remaining primarily a punitive affair. These effects bring up 
fundamental discord between the United States and its regional allies (such as South Korea) who 
have a wider range of politically popular notions at solving the nuclear issue and want to see 
closure on such an affair. 
This paper will begin by reviewing literature on the growth of political polarization of the United 
States which shows that the United States has rapidly polarized with bipartisanship becoming 
increasingly untenable. At the same time, both parties have developed distinct foreign policy 
preferences. These factors have effectively made foreign policy another political arena in which 
an opposition party can limit the President’s ability to pursue foreign policy. 
The paper will then examine the Agreed Framework as a case study for US-DPRK affairs which 
shows that President Clinton’s attempt at opening ties with North Korea was constrained by an 
ascendant Republican Party. Overall, this dynamic meant that Clinton’s initiative was rolled back 
by the Bush administration who had internalized many of the Republican Party’s critiques of the 
Agreed Framework. 
Finally, the paper will review possible counterarguments – that the DPRK’s uranium and missile 
proliferation better explain the collapse of the Agreed Framework. The paper will note that while 
the DPRK’s behavior has contributed to the failure of such agreements, it is not sufficient to 
explain the failure of the Agreed Framework – rather political polarization played a key role in 
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the United States by cementing differing opinions on how to evaluate the deal’s success based 
upon party lines.  
2. Literature Review: 
Political Polarization and American Foreign Policy: 
Political polarization has changed the way the United States pursues its foreign policy. While 
some international relations theorists argue that states pursue their interests as unified actors in a 
rational manner, a growing work of political scientists has revealed that both the methods and 
manner of diplomacy are constrained or permitted through domestic political disputes. Thus, 
polarization will have severe repercussions for any US policy maker, especially if North Korea is 
involved.  
American politics to a great extent is defined between the struggle between the Democratic and 
Republican parties – two parties of equal strength that have been only able to muster miniscule 
majorities in Congress since the 1990s.197 These insecure majorities has fueled a new style of 
combative politics where party members are increasingly motivated to pursue a form of zero sum 
politics, with bipartisanship viewed as “legitimating the in party’s initiatives”.198 This view of 
zero sum politics has increasingly dominated the discourse between the Democratic and 
Republican Parties across the branches of government and has encouraged parties to highlight 
their political differences to increase voter turnout.199  
Concurrent to the increase of partisanship amongst American politics, both Democratic and 
Republican Parties have taken increasingly different views on foreign policy and grand strategy. 
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Republican policy makers have hewed to a foreign policy of “muscular nationalism” 
emphasizing the United States military capabilities, a distaste of multilateral institutions, and an 
idealistic view of American unilateralism in world affairs.200 Changes in foreign policy 
preferences of the Republican base have likewise changed – with Republican voters increasingly 
converging on policy issues that emphasize the use of force while remaining less supportive of 
forms of soft power or legislation perceived as blocking the autonomy of the United States.201 In 
turn this has been reflected on recent Republican administrations, most notably the Reagan and 
Bush II administrations. Both administrations sought the rapid buildup of military forces, with 
Reagan focusing on improving US military posture in Europe whilst Bush sought a muscular 
approach against the War on Terror and a hardline posture on rival states such as China and 
North Korea.202 Additionally, Republican suspicions of multilateralism as a tool of American 
diplomacy were prevalent in both administrations, seeing the Reagan administration’s 
intervention into Grenada and the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in the Bush 
administration.203 These tenets of “muscular nationalism” have likewise become more reflected 
amongst the Republican voting base. Increasingly, Republican voters have taken a more 
affirmative view on the use of force in international affairs while remaining suspicious of soft 
power aspects in foreign policy.204 Predictably these policy preferences to have become points of 
contention between the two parties.205 
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Like many Republican President’s the foreign policy of the Democratic Party has been innately 
tied with the desire to focus the Presidency on domestic affairs.206 However, the Democratic 
Party’s foreign party has remained relatively more diverse – with multiple strands of the party 
ranging from hawkish to relatively dovish.207 Nevertheless, both the most recent Democratic 
Presidencies of Clinton and Obama saw a greater desire to pursue foreign policy objectives 
through multilateralism.208 For both, the desire to do so was partially political – as the end of the 
Cold War and the War on Terror had significantly curbed American appetite to continue military 
interventions abroad.209 However, Democratic administrations shared the same suspicion a of 
unilateral overreach and concern over the lack of a sufficient cost benefit analysis when 
committing US resources abroad.210 This in effect meant that Democratic administrations tended 
to restrain itself in order to preserve the integrity of multilateral institutions which they believe 
could execute US policy due to the country’s primacy in such institutions and multilateral 
institutions reflection of American values.211 Despite this, both administrations did not 
completely pursue foreign policy solely through multilateral means, as the US interventions in 
Kosovo and former Yugoslavia demonstrated. Nevertheless, both administrations significantly 
increased the prominence of international cooperation as core symbols of their foreign policy and 
displayed a greater willingness to pursue the use of détente in the use of foreign policy.212 
While foreign policy differences amongst Presidencies is to be expected, the increasingly 
different foreign policy preferences have meant that foreign policy has become issues salient to 
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candidates on both parties.213 For Republicans, the Democratic appeals of nationalism have been 
weaponized as dangerous sanctions of appeasement while Democratic scorn against the hubris of 
the Iraq War were decisive messages in the 2008 election of President Obama.214 Thus, the 
strengthening of foreign policy preferences amongst political parties have concurrently meant 
that foreign policy have become key points of criticism for the rival party. 
Overall, polarization has meant that President’s face increased costs while pursuing foreign 
policy despite their first mover advantage in any unilateral attempt at forging policy.215 
Increasingly minority parties within Congress has shown an ability to restrain the executive 
branch. This is especially true given a direct conflict of interest between the legislative voting 
base and the President’s agenda.216 Thus, Presidents have sought Congressional approval to 
bolster the legitimacy of military intervention217 and other foreign policy initiatives. In these 
cases, Congress has been effective at extracting political costs of any Presidential foreign policy 
initiative.218 In effect, this has meant that Presidents have been limited in their foreign policy 
pursuits based upon political popularity.219 Yet, as we have seen in polarization, negative 
partisanship has become more pronounced amongst the American electorate220 and 
bipartisanship has been increasingly politically disadvantageous.221 This has meant that 
bipartisanship popularity has become less common and that even in cases of foreign crises, a 
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unifying threat may not necessarily overcome a partisan dynamic especially if the crisis remains 
unresolved for a prolonged period of time.222  
The demise of a unified consensus on US foreign policy means foreign policy is increasingly an 
arena for domestic political disputes. This means that US foreign policy will likely trend to the 
status quo as changes in perceived US policy will likely be considered points of contention.223 
Furthermore, polarization may further complicate the ability of institutional learning in the 
United States from foreign policy failures and increases the risk of sudden shifts in foreign 
policy following a switch in presidential administrations.224 In effect, this means that polarization 
is likely to force US policy into a cycle of status quo and rediscovery as each presidential 
administration seeks to remain in the status quo, learn about its international surroundings, only 
to restart following the end of the administration. As we will see, in the case of North Korea, this 
may result in a losing hand as the US policy towards the Korean peninsula has trended to a 
hostile stalemate in which the DPRK can pursue greater nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, the 
cycle of learning and relearning following presidential limitations may greatly increase the 
chances of miscalculation as each presidential administration may have to rediscover the ways 
the DPRK displays its intentions or willingness to escalate military provocations. 
US Historical Policy to North Korea: 
Now that we can establish how polarization has affected American foreign policy, we must begin 
to look at US-North Korea policy prior to the beginning of political polarization. Doing so will 
allow us to examine the common themes of such policy prior to polarization and allow us to see 
how polarization has caused a disruption on US policy. 
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Following the end of the Korean War, the United States’ policy to North Korea was barely 
existent – merely focusing on enforcing the armistice and remaining vigilant against military 
provocations. Instead, US regional focus was placed more on South Korea, where economic 
growth remained stalled and the authoritarian nature of the regime often strained ties.225 Overall, 
this gloomy outlook towards the South affected US policy towards the Korean peninsula, leading 
for a greater desire to minimize the chances the US could be drawn into conflict in the region.226  
However, beginning in the 1960s, North Korea began to pursue a policy of military provocations 
aimed at inciting a revolution in the South and splitting the US-South alliance.227 Collectively, 
the combined incidents created a period known as the “Second Korean War” where violent 
incidents numbered in the hundreds annually.228 While North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung may 
have believed that such provocations would have enabled an asymmetrical victory against the 
United States, these provocations ironically meant that American policy makers increasingly saw 
withdrawal from the Korean peninsula as a geopolitical risk. In addition, high profile 
provocations such as the kidnapping of the USS Pueblo and the Panmunjeom Ax Murder 
Incident cemented United States posture in Korea as military drawdowns from South Korea 
increasingly became seen as rewarding a state hostile towards the United States.229 This in effect 
meant that presidential prerogatives such as President Carter’s threats to withdraw from South 
Korea became less likely as military withdrawal from South Korea could unintentionally signal a 
lack of resolve of the United States throughout Asia and the World.230 Thus, it became 
increasingly seen as necessary amongst US policy makers to remain in the region and remain 
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vigilant against the North Korean security threat, threatening force when North Korean actions 
seemed likely to force the United States into war.231 
The Need for Détente: 
While the political polarization of the United States may make the ability to achieve détente with 
North Korea unlikely, that does not make the policy in and of itself foolish. In fact, upon closer 
examination, limited détente with North Korea would likely advantage the United States in 
multiple ways. First, is the risk of miscalculation. Throughout the Cold War period, the United 
States and North Korea have engaged in military skirmishes along the demilitarized zone. During 
these provocations, both US and North Korean policy makers had difficulty in assessing the 
actual goals of the other side and often had to rely on conjecture and various forms of risk 
mitigation to prevent a military escalation.232 In addition, North Korean provocations have 
explicitly targeted both South Korean military personnel and civilians, meaning that while some 
armed provocations may not have necessarily targeted the United States, there still remains a risk 
of being dragged into an armed conflict with the North.233 Nevertheless, as North Korea has 
increasingly developed second strike capabilities and its ability to target the United States with 
nuclear weapons, the risk of an armed provocation escalating into nuclear conflict has increased. 
While the United States has seen prolonged periods of nuclear standoff (most notably with the 
Soviet Union for the duration of the Cold War), US presidents routinely met with Soviet leaders 
and developed extensive mechanisms to ensure that crises did not devolve into war. However, 
such mechanisms do not exist in the current US-DPRK relationship. Thus, the establishment of 
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basic diplomatic mechanisms and military mechanisms to prevent the outbreak or escalation of 
military hostilities would serve both the United States, South Korea, and the North. 
Secondly, the issue arises of whether the idea of the hostile peace currently favors the United 
States. While the United States holds military and economic superiority over North Korea, North 
Korea has demonstrated the ability to nonetheless test and refine its nuclear weapons programs 
despite the enactment of multiple US sanctions. Effectively this places US policy makers in a 
conundrum as North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is something that North Korea will not 
give up.234 Thus policy makers either must choose between military conflict if diplomatic 
methods are not used. In many ways, this allows Pyongyang to hold an advantage in the long 
term because absent a diplomatic deal that would end the nuclear issue, the DPRK continues to 
be free to refine its nuclear capabilities despite the sanctions.235 Overall this means that while the 
United States may make economic or political concessions in the search for a rapprochement, the 
long term gains of a curbed North Korean nuclear program may outweigh the costs involved in 
obtaining them. 
Conclusion: 
Increasingly, America’s political polarization has lead to a polarization of American foreign 
policy. As a result, political polarization will act as a restraint on the pursuit of détente with 
North Korea across Presidential administrations. Despite this, I show that the current state of 
hostile peace may not necessarily be the best for the United States and that limited forms of 
sustained détente would benefit the United States. Thus, the question is raised, can the US pursue 
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détente with North Korea across presidential administrations given the polarized nature of the 
country? 
3. Methodology: 
To test whether political polarization prevents the United States from pursuing détente with 
North Korea across Presidential administrations, we will look at the Clinton Administration’s 
Agreed Framework and examine whether political polarization prevented Agreed Framework 
from being pursued across presidential administrations.  
In the Clinton administration’s case, North Korea’s weapons program lead to near war between 
the two states. Quick intervention from President Jimmy Carter allowed for a diplomatic solution 
to the affair and the United States began to scale up its diplomatic meetings with North Korean 
officials, leading to the signing of the KEDO agreement. Towards the end of his Presidency, 
Clinton began sending higher level United States officials in the hopes of furthering his détente 
and ensuring that North Korea would cap its nuclear program. Nevertheless, we will see that 
Clinton’s outreach was not welcomed by the opposing Republican Party which sought to 
undermine the Clinton administration’s outreach through the restriction of funding towards the 
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and by adding on additional inspections to 
the Agreed Framework. This process cumulated with the election of the Republican candidate 
George Bush who soon dismantled the Clinton administration’s policy of outreach. 
From there we will explore an alternative explanation for the Agreed Framework’s collapse – 
that the DPRK’s uranium and missile proliferation were the reason for the deal’s collapse and 
that the Agreed Framework was unable to restrain North Korea’s missile ambitions.  
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4. Clinton Administration: 
The interactions undertaken by President Clinton represented an unprecedented diplomatic 
campaign that sought to achieve détente with, and the denuclearization of, North Korea. 
Unsurprisingly, the unprecedented nature of the campaign elicited strong partisan fervor. 
However, while outreach towards North Korea soon became a high profile event that defined the 
Clinton administration’s foreign policy, the origins of such outreach began accidentally. 
Towards the end of the George HW Bush administration, the United States began to review its 
commitments around the world. This was meant to reduce geopolitical tensions as the Cold War 
ended. As part of this, the United States undertook a withdrawal of nuclear weapons forward 
positioned in the Korean peninsula.236 These efforts lead to the North South Denuclearization 
Declaration between the two Korea’s – an agreement that severely curtailed both Korea’s ability 
to refine and reprocess fissile material and allowed inspectors from the IAEA.237 Thus, as the 
Clinton administration began its term, it would seem that the US-DPRK relationship would 
continue the rapprochement begun by George HW Bush. However, inspections by the IAEA 
soon lead to the realization that North Korea had reprocessed enough plutonium to manufacture 
two bombs.238 As a result, the North denied inspectors access to the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility, 
a processing plant that the US had suspected was the primary facility behind North Korea’s 
nuclear weapon’s production.239 
The failure to provide access to the IAEA inspectors lead to a rapid increase in tensions, quite 
possibly remaining the closest the United States went to war with North Korea prior to the “Fire 
and Fury” period of the Trump administration. North Korea announced its intent to leave the 
 
236 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2005, 9-10 
237 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2005, 10 
238 Sigal 1997 
239 Timeline, PBS Frontline 
69 
 
Nonproliferation Treaty within 90 days.240 Due to the belief that an atomic North Korea would 
be imminent, North Korean threats to reduce Seoul into a “sea of fire”, and North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the IAEA, the Clinton administration began to consider military options.241 
Thankfully, last minute negotiations lead by former President Jimmy Carter and North Korean 
leader Kim Il Sung lead to an agreement to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program in exchange 
for economic and political guarantees.242 
It was in this aftermath that the US and North Korea began negotiations, seeking a deal that 
would satisfy US concerns on North Korean plutonium enrichment and North Korean losses on 
their electrical grid. These negotiations lead to the creation and signing of the Agreed 
Framework wherein North Korea would freeze its nuclear program and allow inspectors to verify 
the status of Yongbyon Nuclear Facility and other graphite moderated reactors.243 In exchange, 
the United States would agree to provide fuel and light water reactors to compensate the North 
for the loss of electricity.244 In the mean time, both countries pledged to ease tensions, establish 
liaison offices, and to work on normalizing relations between both countries.245 To do this, the 
United States formed the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) – a 
multinational consortium with South Korea and Japan that would provide both the funding and 
implementation of economic aid to North Korea.246 
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Whilst the Agreed Framework was signed as an executive agreement, domestic support amongst 
the American public would be key to the Framework’s success. Thus, Clinton sought to gain 
support Congressional and other political leaders, visiting former President George HW Bush 
while negotiations were still underway. In the meeting, Clinton briefed his predecessor on the 
general outlines of the agreement. Bush upon hearing this gave his tacit approval for the deal’s 
fundamentals.247 Similar efforts were made to court former President Gerald Ford who while not 
explicitly supporting the deal, emphasized that the Agreed Framework still allowed the United 
States to stymie a resurgent North Korea if negotiations were to fail.248 Nevertheless, while 
Clinton was able to win a sense of acknowledgement from former Republican statesman, the 
reality of the 1994 election had rapidly changed the makeup of Congress. 
Following the 1994 elections, the Republican Party was ascendant. Sweeping aside the former 
Democratic majority, the Republican Party now commanded both the House, Senate, and key 
committees. Ideologically and politically both sides were far apart as Clinton a Democrat tended 
towards the American liberal tradition while Newt Gingrich sought to represent a resurgent 
conservative wave at home and a muscular nationalism abroad.249 It is perhaps unsurprising then 
that the Agreed Framework also received a suspicious reaction from the Republican Congress 
who argued that such a deal was only possible due to the concessions that the United States made 
and that the agreement to send fuel to North Korea was unconscionable.250 Nevertheless, while 
the Republican Party could mount a full assault on the Agreed Framework, they were 
constrained in two ways. First, was that the if the Republican Party let the Agreed Framework 
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fail, they would hold responsibility if the deal fell apart.251 In addition, while many Republicans 
did not like the Agreed Framework, there was no clear alternative to the deal.252  
Nevertheless, the Republican Party was not completely powerless. The fact that key committees 
were held by Republican Congressmembers meant that any release of funds involved with the 
the Agreed Framework would have to pass through Republican scrutiny. 253 This presented a 
great opportunity for the Republican Party to go on the offensive. 
The first major dispute over the Agreed Framework occurred during the funding for KEDO. 
While the Agreed Framework promised North Korea $10 million in heavy oil aid, the House of 
Representatives passed HJR 83, meant to prevent the United States disbursing any foreign aid to 
North Korea.254 Caught flat footed, the Clinton administration had to find a way to ensure the 
United States could maintained its end of the deal. First, the Clinton administration signed the 
bipartisan Dole Amendment which ensured that the United States would only provide aid given 
verification of the lack of North Korea’s nuclear program.255 By doing this, the Clinton 
administration sought to reassure Congressmembers that aid promised by the Agreed Framework 
would directly achieve the goals the Agreed Framework meant to achieve. In addition, the 
Clinton administration resorted to scrounging the budget for discretionary funds that could be 
diverted to ensure the United States could fund the light water reactors agreed to in the Agreed 
Framework.256 Nevertheless, while such legal gymnastics ensured that the Agreed Framework 
could survive, the concessions made by Congress in effect increased the leverage the Republican 
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Party could use to effect the bill. Besides the use of funding, the Republican Party was able to 
use the idea of inspections to further pressure the Clinton administration. While the Agreed 
Framework did not specifically specify the nature of inspections, the Republican Party was able 
to tie funding with the nature of inspections further eroding the Clinton administration’s ability 
to negotiate.257 
In 1998, North Korea launched a missile test, claiming that it was a satellite test.258 Soon, the 
second showdown over the Agreed Framework began. While missile developments were not 
covered in the Agreed Framework, Republican members of Congress were irate, claiming that 
North Korea could now hit Seattle, not just Seoul.259 Republicans argued that as a result, the 
United States should refuse aid to North Korea, employ more coercive measures against North 
Korea to bring it to the negotiating table, and increase its missile defense capabilities.260 
Nevertheless, the Clinton administration differed from the Republican approach. Due to the 
missile programs, President Clinton ordered a policy review under Secretary of Defense William 
Perry. However, unlike the Republican response, Secretary of Defense Perry suggested that the 
United States would maintain a military advantage over North Korea and thus should seek to 
solidify political ties between the two states and further a diplomatic disarmament of North 
Korea’s missile and WMD program.261 Failure to pursue greater ties, Perry argued, would 
endanger the small gains that the Agreed Framework had made.262 Perry’s words were extremely 
prescient as Congress then cut all funding for the Agreed Framework, and the subsequent 
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election of George Bush meant that a separate deal that would both open greater ties between the 
two states and address Pyongyang’s growing missile program were shelved.263 
The End of the Agreed Framework: 
The election of George W. Bush marked a pivotal point in the Agreed Framework. Whilst the so 
called Perry Process argued that the United States would “give more to get more”, the Bush 
administration remained highly suspicious of any engagement with North Korea and placed US-
North Korea policy under a policy review.264 Although such a policy review ostensibly 
maintained Clinton’s North Korean policy, there were key differences – refusing to reconfirm the 
administration’s commitment to a non-hostile relationship with the DPRK, demands for 
additional inspection without any reciprocation, demands of reduction of North Korea’s 
conventional military force, and the inclusion of North Korea’s missile program into the Agreed 
Framework despite a lack of any concurrent agreement on the American side.265 Soon, the outset 
of the War on Terror fundamentally changed the dynamic between the two states, transforming 
the US-North Korean policy from malign neglect to open hostility.266 While North Korea had 
expressed regret over the 9/11 attacks and had expressed willingness to cooperate with the 
United States upon counter-terrorism, increasingly the Bush administration saw North Korea as a 
likely source of missile and nuclear technology.267 Thus, the Bush administration began to 
increase both pressure on North Korea through rhetorical measures, outlining North Korea as 
part of a global axis of evil.268 In addition, subsequent policy changes such as outlining the use of 
preventative war in the National Defense Authorization Act increased North Korean suspicion of 
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the Bush administration’s intentions.269 In this time, the final blow came from North Korea itself. 
Intelligence came to show that the North Korean regime still retained uranium processing plants, 
although the scale of such projects could not be confirmed.270 In response, the United States 
halted remaining fuel shipments to North Korea. As a result, North Korea subsequently left the 
NPT and detonated its first nuclear weapon.271 
Why Did the Agreed Framework Fail? 
From our review of the partisan controversy over the Agreed Framework, we can conclude that 
the deeply polarized nature of American politics both prevented a smooth execution of the 
Agreed Framework and ensured that the Agreed Framework was abandoned following the 
Clinton Administration. Republican opposition towards the Agreed Framework was almost 
immediate – or as Ambassador Gallucci put it, “We did not get ticker tape parades, as it turned 
out”.272 Throughout the Framework’s existence, Republican critiques argued that the Agreed 
Framework represented United States paying another state for bad behavior and that instead the 
United States should increase the use of coercive diplomacy to ensure that North Korea acceded 
to American demands.273 And while some Republicans were unable to iterate a detailed alternate 
solution to the current impasse, the Republican Party still remained suspicious of any 
reimbursements towards North Korea.274 Overall, these critiques were interwoven with a greater 
critique of the Clinton administration – that the administration was strategically inept and lacked 
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the ability to use America’s moment as the sole superpower to shape the world image in its 
shape.275 
As a result, the Republican Party executed a policy of stonewalling – denouncing the Agreed 
Framework as foolish and by defunding the Agreement to minimize its efficacy.276 At the same 
time, such measures did not explicitly destroy the Agreed Framework, in a sense absolving the 
Republican Party any blame for jettisoning the Clinton administration’s diplomacy. However, 
such efforts decreased the ability of the United States to fulfill measures within the deal, 
hindering the chance of success. In effect, this meant that in the case the deal failed, the 
Republican Party could claim foresight of the Clinton administration’s policies and paint it as a 
greater political failure on a rival presidential administration. 277  
It is little surprise then, that the Bush administration began his term with suspicion on the Agreed 
Framework and in many ways integrated Republican critiques of the Agreed Framework –  that 
North Korea had extracted too many concessions from the United States, that the missile 
program presented a comprehensive threat to the United States, and that more coercive measures 
should be used to gain a better deal.278 Thus, the Bush administration argued for a 
comprehensive North Korean policy would simultaneously address the human rights abuses, 
food aid, refugee aid, and the missile program whilst minimizing economic aid given to North 
Korea under the Agreed Framework.279 The increased demands spurred the North Korean belief 
that the United States was changing its demands and was seeking to break the Agreed 
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Framework.280 As a result,  US-North Korean relations declined rapidly, with the North Korea 
leaving the NPT and detonating its first nuclear weapon. 
5. Counterpoint: Did North Korea itself destroy the Agreed Framework: 
While some have presented the Agreed Framework as a missed opportunity between the United 
States and North Korea, others have argued that it was North Korea itself that ended the Agreed 
Framework. Critiques of the framework generally can be framed under the following line of 
thought. While polarization may have constrained the Clinton administration’s pursuit of 
rapprochement, it was North Korea that made this untenable. Critics point out to the discovery of 
North Korea’s uranium enrichment around 1998, 4 years after the Agreed Framework was signed 
and North Korea’s selling of nuclear and missile technology to Syria as examples of North Korea 
failing to hold its end of the bargain. 281  This, critics argue was the reason the Bush 
administration chose not to continue the Agreed Framework.  
However, while this is an interesting speculation, such critique has a number of flaws. The first 
flaw is that while such actions were a provocation towards US-DPRK rapprochement, they did 
not constitute a direct violation of the Agreed Framework. Throughout both the negotiations, the 
Agreed Framework focused explicitly on the containing of plutonium within North Korea’s 
graphite reactors.282 While the Clinton administration was concerned with North Korean 
proliferation threats and uranium enrichment, the Clinton administration sought to contain these 
developments in future deals via the Perry Process. Thus, while a future presidential 
administration would have had to deal with further North Korean provocations, it was a Bush 
administration interpretation that the Agreed Framework would encompass proliferation 
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concerns or would act as a litmus test for a greater easing of ties between the two states. Given 
Republican concerns of the Agreed Framework, it is unsurprising that the Agreed Framework 
was not seen as the beginning of a long process of rapprochement but rather as a test on whether 
North Korea could be trusted in the same way.283 Thus, domestic political ideology rather than 
North Korea itself has greater explanatory power on the collapse of the Agreed Framework. 
A second criticism is that the Agreed Framework only provided North Korea incentives for 
cooperating with the United States and thus held no coercive measure to force North Korea back 
to the table if it cheated. However, this is not the case. Rather, the Agreed Framework provided 
the United States an opportunity to address North Korean attempts at cheating with regional 
allies via KEDO.284 This mechanism was used throughout the Clinton administration with the 
administration holding trilateral summits between the leaders of South Korea, Japan, and the 
United States along with holding multiple rounds of lower trilateral negotiations. 285 These 
meetings allowed the United States to communicate its concerns with North Korean nuclear and 
missile programs and allowed for a united front between the regional allies that took into account 
South Korean and Japanese fears of escalating military tensions leading into war.286 In addition, 
the Agreed Framework’s possibility a positive relationship between the region served as a reason 
why sensitive issues like the possibility of missile proliferation or uranium enrichment could be 
addressed instead of prompting a North Korean diplomatic retreat.287 This sentiment was 
furthered by the South Korean analysis of the situation, with the Korean president arguing that 
the North Korean government would likely continue a slow path toward rapprochement given 
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the North Korean state reaping the benefits of détente.288 Thus, the Agreed Framework provided 
the US and its allies rewards and a platform to confront North Korea over its uranium enrichment 
while providing the North Korean officials positive reasons why uranium enrichment would be 
harmful for future ties.289 
Finally, critics argue that the Agreed Framework was perceived as a temporary measure to gain 
North Korea time for its ultimate goal – a nuclear powered state. While North Korea in recent 
times has moved to make nuclear weapons a core part of its weapons arsenal, such resolve was 
not as firm in the ‘90s.290 While North Korea did demure or slow walk the handing over its 
plutonium rods towards the United States, Clinton officials like Robert Gallucci saw these 
actions as a reluctance to give up leverage with the United States – believing that once plutonium 
rods were given to the United States, the DPRK would lose its ability to secure any concessions 
from the United States. Thus, the DPRK sought to give plutonium rods once the light water 
reactors was complete. Ironically, political scientists like Ankit Panda muse that the failure of the 
Agreed Framework may have had the opposite effect the United States wanted – that being given 
the Bush administration’s disinterest in continuing rapprochement, failing ties between the 
nation, and the US invasion of Iraq that convinced North Korean leadership that an independent 
nuclear deterrence was necessary.291 
6. Can a polarized America pursue détente across Presidential administrations: 
So, can a polarized United States pursue détente with North Korea across Presidential 
administrations? Looking at the Agreed Framework, this seems unlikely. Throughout its time, 
 
288 Cable, American Embassy Seoul 6928 to Secretary of State, December 8, 1998, Subject: Former Secretary 
Perry's Meeting with President Kim (Confidential) 
289 National Security Council, Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee, July 21,1999 
290 Panda 2020, Chapter 2 
291 Panda 2020, 52 
79 
 
the Agreed Framework’s high profile nature made it an easy target for opponents looking for an 
example of the Clinton administration’s strategic incompetence. Furthermore, the fact that the 
Agreed Framework left the US-North Korea relationship at the beginning stages of a détente 
meant that the critics could cite slow progress as evidence the DPRK could not be negotiated 
with. In all likelihood, any future deal with North Korea is likely to face the same constraints. 
The past 30 years have seen partisanship increase and divided government has become the norm 
– granting any opposition party the opportunity, the leverage and the platform to oppose any 
Presidential deal.292 This means that rapprochement will face an emboldened opposition and a 
Presidential successor that has little reason to maintain an unpopular deal. With these challenges 
in mind, it is little surprise that détente with North Korea will not likely survive presidential 
administrations – and in fact, should be seen as a norm. So, what does the US-DPRK relationship 
have in store? 
For the foreseeable future, the US-DPRK relationship is likely to remain tense. Although a 
President may use their authority to pursue rapprochement with North Korea, as the Agreed 
Framework showed, Congress has multiple means to complicate such a pursuit. Furthermore, 
while a diplomatic breakthrough may serve as a watershed moment for any President, the 
possibility of a domestic backlash may serve as a deterrent for a President thinking of such a 
pursuit. In effect, this means that future President’ may increasingly see North Korea as a lost 
cause and may seek to ignore the country, merely maintain the current US posture in the region.  
While American President’s may have had less motivation to negotiate with North Korea, the 
prospect of brokering a historic solution towards the North Korea has been noticed – by the 
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North Koreans who have increasingly used the ideas of brokering a historic agreement between 
the two states as a concession given to a US president.293 While such efforts, have fallen short of 
directly motivating a US President to broker an arms control deal with North Korea, there 
remains a possibility that given a desperate American president and a pliant Congress, an 
unfavorable agreement with North Korea may be reached. 
In addition, elected officials are loath to seem weak to a regime that not remains not only a 
provocateur to the United States, but also as one of the world’s most flagrant human rights 
abusers. This means that initiators of détente with North Korea are likely to be outflanked by 
critics arguing to maintain a hardline stance. In all likelihood, this is good politics. After all, 
President Clinton himself called on the United States to tie its economic relations with human 
rights conditions in China during his election and was able to gain domestic political support for 
his stance.294 However, while such grandstanding may be good politics, it remains to be seen 
whether such acts constitute good diplomacy. In effect, grandstanding turns North Korean policy 
into a punitive affair, engaging with North Korea only when the DPRK first accedes to United 
States policy demands. Nevertheless, it is questionable that this is effective. Ambassador 
Gallucci argued that North Korea believed that acceding to all US demands would be tantamount 
to surrender and that absent a diplomatic solution, North Korea would unilaterally pursue its 
nuclear capabilities.295 Gallucci’s logic still seems prescient. Even now, North Korea’s nuclear 
capabilities and ambitions have increased – yet the United States has sought unilateral North 
Korean disarmament before lifting of any sanctions. 20 years later, it remains to be seen whether 
such a strategy will work. 
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Overall, the underdeveloped relationship between the US and North Korea will likely have two 
major consequences for US foreign policy. The first, is that the problem of miscalculation will 
likely remain in the future. Throughout the Cold War and the negotiations of the Agreed 
Framework, military incidents and provocations pushed both countries to the brink of war. While 
cooler heads prevailed, there remains a chance that military miscalculation could lead into an 
unintentional war. In relationships, such as the Sino-US relationship the business community has 
played a key role in mitigating these hiccups, pressuring the US government to mitigate the 
worst possible outcome between the two states.296 However, in the US-DPRK relationship, this 
dynamic is not present. This means that US policy makers will have little restraint besides the 
threat of war to engage in predictions with North Korea. 
This dynamic leads to another consequence of the negative dynamic of US-DPRK relations – the 
risk of alienating allies neighboring North Korea. While the United States would suffer 
immensely in a second Korean War, the US remains out of range from most of North Korea’s 
weaponry. This is not the case for US allies like South Korea or Japan who would see their 
homelands directly attacked in a resumption of hostilities. Given an unmitigated negative 
dynamic between the US and North Korea, allied states may increasingly view the United States’ 
approach to North Korea as too naïve or dangerous and may seek to forge separate 
understandings between North Korea.297 This would severely weaken US policy in two ways. 
First, the US depends greatly on allied contributions to project power in the region. This would 
limit the options any US president would have to deal with other regional threats such as China 
or North Korea itself. Finally, it would make further negotiations with North Korea even more 
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difficult as past approaches have sought to project a united front with US allies in order to ensure 
North Korea does not skirt punitive measures that were emplaced.   
Thus, we can see that US-North Korean relations remains a difficult issue for the United States 
to address. While the Clinton administration sought a diplomatic solution with the North Korean 
government, such efforts were severely constrained by a polarized Congress. Implications from 
such actions mean that future US Presidents will likely face the same domestic political 
constraints that Clinton did – decreasing the likelihood of a future US President from attempting 
to solve the issue. This will in the long term increase the chance for miscalculation on either side 















This thesis demonstrates that US foreign policy has been greatly shaped by domestic political 
competition in three ways. First, by comparing the process of ratification between the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), we can see that confirmation votes have come down on party lines. This greatly 
affected bipartisan views of such agreements. NAFTA, while initially being criticized was 
allowed to remain in affect for over two decades before being updated in a separate agreement 
that largely resembled NAFTA whereas the United States withdrew from the JCPOA during the 
following administration. This indicates that partisan views during the confirmation of such 
agreements were critical in the long term survival of such agreements. Furthermore, the 
increased party unity on foreign affairs demonstrates that foreign policy preferences have 
become increasingly solidified between parties. This means that future political or legislative 
executive agreements are less likely to be viewed as legitimate by the opposition party. As a 
result, the longevity of a President’s foreign agenda is likely to be hinged on the strength of his 
or her party.  
Furthermore, research on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) shows that 
previously bipartisan legislation has become increasingly contentious. In great deal, this is due to 
the replacement of previously moderate Republicans by more partisan Republican Senators or 
Democrats. The replacement of moderate Republican Senators removes a critical base of support 
that was essential for New START to be ratified and makes the possibility of future arms control 
agreements being pursued through a treaty mechanism as increasingly unlikely. Instead, future 
arms control agreements will likely face greater partisan scrutiny as new Republican Senators 
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have showed an increasingly unilateral view on foreign policy. This means that any future 
President will have to spend significantly more time and political capital on increasing the 
United States military’s capabilities as a policy concession to hawkish members of the Senate. 
This may further complicate treaty formation as other countries are likely to see increasingly 
large US military budgets as a direct threat and thus have an increased suspicion of the utility of 
any arms control agreement. 
Finally, research on the Clinton administration’s outreach towards the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK colloquially known as North Korea) shows the limits that partisanship 
places on a President’s unilateral ability to seek détente. Throughout the Clinton administration’s 
seeking of détente with North Korea, increasingly specific and difficult verification measures 
were added to the treaty. Furthermore, actions by the House of Representatives meant that the 
Clinton administration had to simultaneously resolve other outstanding issues in the US-DPRK 
relationship. This meant that progress was slow and were an easy target for the upcoming 
Presidential elections. Following the transition to the Bush administration, the Clinton 
administration’s outreach towards North Korea was abandoned. 
Such an experience shows that polarization has made seeking détente extremely difficult for 
American Presidents. The easing of tensions takes time and the slow progress, lack of immediate 
results, and the high profile nature of such endeavors means that these diplomatic endeavors will 
likely attract partisan criticism. And given a transition of power between the parties, outreach 
towards hostile nations are likely to be abandoned as a symbolic means of differentiating the new 
administration from the old.  
85 
 
Research from this thesis has multiple implications for foreign policy. The first is that foreign 
policy preferences between the Democratic and Republican Parties have diverged significantly. 
As seen from Republican opposition to the Clinton administration’s outreach to North Korea, 
changing opinions on New START, and opposition to the JCPOA, the Republican Party has 
placed an increasingly large emphasis on a militaristic and unilateral foreign policy. Meanwhile, 
as seen by the three case studies, the Democratic Party has generally retained a larger emphasis 
on negotiation and a greater willingness to achieve détente with hostile states. In general, this 
means that Democratic and Republican Presidents will come into office with differing foreign 
policy views and are conversely less likely to continue the prior administration’s policies 
(assuming they come from a rival party). This means that the likelihood of a new President 
adopting foreign policy platforms from their predecessor is significantly decreased – weakening 
a key plank of domestic support needed to enact a treaty. Furthermore, widening of gaps between 
these two parties thus opens up a possibility of foreign policy being used to rally greater voter 
turnout and thus places foreign policy into a core area of political competition.  
This has troubling implications on many levels. First, many foreign policy issues cannot be 
solved within one presidential term. As seen with counterproliferation measures during the Cold 
War, consecutive numbers of Presidents were needed to refine United States counterproliferation 
policy and arms control policies.298 And even after the Cold War ended, consistent 
counterproliferation approach is still needed to minimize the risks of nuclear war and nuclear 
proliferation. Thus, if political polarization emphasizes the need for quick solutions, it is likely 
that the range of foreign policy problems that can be solved will be significantly decreased. 
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Another implication from this thesis’ research is that the means for a President to conduct 
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy has been substantively decreased. Both research on 
Republican views of the JCPOA, New START, and the Clinton’s diplomatic engagement 
showed that America’s polarized landscape has generally hindered muscular foreign policies less 
than they have hindered more dovish foreign policies. In both the near expiration of New 
START and the failure of the Agreed Framework, the opposition party in both cases was able to 
challenge reasons why such diplomatic agreements were not favorable to the United States. 
Nevertheless, such arguments did not challenge a converse discussion on whether the failure of 
such agreements to the United States. Instead, both arguments for the expiration of New START 
or the dismantlement of the Agreed Framework generally pointed to increased military spending 
on various missile defense systems as reason why the United States could afford to pass by on 
such treaties. Given these trends, it is likely that American Presidents will be unable to formulate 
new treaties and maintain their current ones while military spending increases will remain or 
increase. In the long term, this may mean that the United States ability to force other nations into 
negotiations may be predicated more on perceived military superiority rather than a balance of 
military and diplomatic power. Such an imbalance is dangerous as the slow degradation of 
diplomatic power means that nations will likely see American attempts at diplomacy as primarily 
a coercive endeavor and thus may choose to either ignore the United States or to build up their 
own military capabilities to offset the United States advantage.  
Areas where these phenomena may be the most common may be in Iran and North Korea where 
both countries have faced the most politicized foreign policy process. In both countries, an 
opposition party’s consistent messaging that a more muscular approach is needed have 
encouraged North Korean and Iranian leaders to further their high stakes diplomacy – conducting 
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provocations as a show of force to prove the high cost a larger war may hold while also seizing 
the diplomatic initiative. This significantly raises the cost of a war accidentally being triggered 
when the United States conducts a response that may accidentally tip off the other side that a 
large scale conflict may be triggered.  
Such worries are not hypothetical. Republican worries critiques against the Obama 
administration’s weaknesses on both Iran and North Korea were greatly internalized by the 
following Trump administration which rapidly increased tensions with both countries. In the case 
of North Korea, the DPRK’s development of an ICBM capable of targeting the United States 
built up confidence with the North Korean government that it could negotiate with the United 
States in strength, while Iranian provocations with United States led to Iran firing at US military 
bases in Iraq.299 Thus in the first case, a cassus belli was avoided by the North Korean 
government unilaterally believing that its missile development had achieved sufficient deterrence 
capability while war in Iran was avoided due to the lack of American casualties. 
The thesis has also shown that polarization has often forced Presidents to defend their foreign 
policy achievements as grand bargains – that being treaties that fundamentally alter the United 
States relations with another country despite whether such treaties are actually meant to do so. 
This could be seen in both the arguments of the JCPOA, New START, and the Agreed 
Framework wherein Republican Congressmen and Senators argued that the preceding deals were 
all fatally flawed due to the deals being unable to address Iranian military provocations, North 
Korean human rights abuses, or the possibility of an increased Chinese nuclear arsenal. This 
essentially forced the President to link differing bilateral issues in the same treaty. Nevertheless, 
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this expectation greatly complicated the President’s ability to conclude such a treaty as countries 
like North Korea, Russia, or Iran either sought political concessions from the United States in 
return or argued that such moves were outside the purview of negotiations.  
As a result, the fallacy of the grand bargain placed the United States in a position where in order 
to quiet domestic opposition, all outstanding bilateral issues must either be solved or implicitly 
left with a lack of deal. However, does such a line of thinking serve American interests? 
Arguably not. A common thread for these agreements is that they constrained at different levels 
the nuclear ambitions of rival countries, that being Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, 
without such a deal there would be no incentive for each country to restrain their nuclear 
program. This would represent a worst possible outcome for the United States. Especially with 
North Korea, where the country successfully detonated its first atom bomb following the end of 
the Agreed Framework, the country’s ambitions have switched to bargaining for a nuclear 
drawdown to enshrining nuclear weapons as a key part of its national defense policy. Even now, 
denuclearization with North Korea looks exceedingly unlikely. 
Possible Solutions: 
If America is trending towards polarization, then what steps can be taken to minimize its effects 
on foreign policy? First of all, the onus is on American politicians to do better and treat foreign 
policy issues that could have immediate negative effects on the American people as a serious 
matter. Issues like nuclear weapons still pose an immediate threat to the human species and thus 
American politicians should seek to argue in good faith about the merits of a policy rather than 
its perceived domestic political benefit.  
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One area where such collaboration seems possible is in Sino-American relations. Two pieces of 
legislation in particular, the Strategic Competition Act of 2021 and the Endless Frontier Act have 
sought to increase US funding towards countering Chinese influence across the world along with 
increasing US funding for practical sciences (which China is perceived to be gaining influence 
over).300 Nevertheless, while there seems to be convergence in policy, this does not imply a 
similar outlook towards China. For Republicans, views are remarkably more hawkish. A 
supermajority of Republican leaders and Republican voters view containing China as a core 
national priority.301 Thus Republican voters tend to support policy both containing China, 
ensuring the US and Chinese economies are not overly intertwined, and even revoking the visas 
of Chinese students.302 
Democratic voters have approached Sino-American relations in a different fashion. While a 
significant portion of Democratic voters view countering China as a primary concern, polling 
shows that Democrats prefer policies that combine engagement with a number of policies also 
popular with Republicans.303 This includes policies that sanctions Chinese officials for its 
atrocities in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong, blocking Chinese technology in strategic 
infrastructure in the United States and abroad.304 Together, these shared combined policy 
preferences between the Democratic and Republican Parties constitute an area where limited 
cooperation can be achieved. 
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Besides cooperation on Sino-American ties, there are other ways to achieve greater 
bipartisanship in American foreign policy. One way that such sentiments could be 
operationalized could be through framing diplomacy through the lenses of damage reduction 
rather than seeing diplomacy as a Manichean effort.  
To do this, American leaders should avoid using the language of a grand bargain, especially 
when deals negotiated with other nations are essentially agreements meant to cut down on trigger 
hair diplomacy. This may be a more effective approach for a couple of reasons. Americans may 
have negative views of rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea, but the appetite for 
conducting war on such powers remains even lower. Thus, framing future diplomatic efforts with 
American foes as a way of minimizing accidental war sidesteps the fallacy that such efforts are 
meant to achieve a perfect solution to the problems between such countries and refocuses the aim 
on preventing a worse outcome from occurring. Furthermore, framing such moves in such a way 
forces the opposition party to either acquiesce towards a deal or be viewed as the spoiler for such 
a deal occurring. As previously stated, while grand deals are viewed with suspicion, appetite for 
a large war remains lower. Thus, by promoting such a deal in this dichotomy would force the 
opposition to pay a political cost if it chose to jettison such a deal by allowing the opposition 
party to be framed as needlessly uncooperative or engaged in irresponsible diplomacy. This 
would likely encourage voters friendly towards the President or détente in general to more 
forcefully advocate for them.  
Finally, American political leaders could minimize the effects of political polarization on foreign 
relations by attacking political polarization itself. As this thesis has shown, the current political 
climate remains unfavorable to moderate politicians as both the American voter and the average 
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politician increasingly sees the political process through party conflict. Nevertheless, moderate 
politicians, or at least politicians willing to side with the opposition party are necessary for a 
consistent foreign policy. Therefore, what ways could moderate politicians be empowered? 
One way would be to appoint committee heads and deputies based upon a combination of the 
politician’s expertise on the subject matter, ideological views, and ability to craft oversight rather 
than the committee head or deputy’s party affiliation itself. In the current system, all committee 
heads and deputies come from the majority party. This has created a system wherein the 
opposition party loses all influence in each committee and is thus encouraged to use the 
withholding of support as their greatest tool. Thus, if committee appointments are given based 
upon factors other than a politician’s party affiliation, this may in the long term dent the desire 
for politicians in both party to encourage voter discontent and also encourage a more cordial 
attitude when Congress is in session. 
Nevertheless, such an approach has its faults. The thesis has shown that polarization has meant 
that Republican and Democratic views have shifted away from each other. Thus, appointing a 
committee head may mean that the committee head’s ideological view may be different than 
those of the majority. And amongst the Republican party where ideological polarization is more 
extreme, there are few moderate Senate members left – with even their views still having a 
conservative bent. Thus, this approach while noble may have limited utility in reality. 
A second solution would be for a return to the sun and moon party system - having one party win 
enough votes to hold a majority in Congress for a long period of time. While such a process 
could take many election cycles, this is arguably more realistic than the former proposal to cut 
down on political polarization. After all, this system was present multiple times in American 
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history and allowed for the majority party to better negotiate with an opposition party because 
the opposition party’s views were unable to stop any single vote. In this system, either the 
Democratic or Republican Party would work to expand their party’s share over Congressional 
seats as large as possible. From this position of strength, the majority party would be able to pass 
legislation relatively easily. The minority party on the other hand would have an incentive to 
cooperate with the majority party to ensure that their suggestions could be integrated into future 
laws. 
While this system was certainly the norm in American politics though, this does not look feasible 
in the near future. For one, states have become increasingly sorted thus guaranteeing any party a 
set number of seats in the Senate. This was not as strong in previous party systems in which 
polarization was not present.305 Furthermore, the rise of partisan media further makes this 
suggestion difficult. In the past, American media was relatively more consolidated which meant 
that Americans generally got their news source from the same sources.306 This meant that 
Americans generally agreed on the same political events occurring. However, partisan media has 
meant that a certain segment of the American population will likely be predisposed to one side or 
the other. As a result, barring a significant event, it will be difficult for one party to slowly 
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This thesis has demonstrated that political polarization has affected American foreign policy by 
causing a solidification of foreign policy views amongst partisan lines. This has made legislative 
executive agreements become confirmed amongst partisan lines and encouraging the opposition 
party to oppose such agreements. Furthermore, polarization has significantly eroded bipartisan 
support for treaties in once uncontroversial areas such as counter proliferation. This means that 
treaties are likely to become less common and that existing treaties may be reevaluated as a 
political affair. Finally, this thesis has shown that polarization has greatly eroded the President’s 
unilateral ability to pursue détente. 
The following findings likely point to a future where the U.S. will be unable to work towards a 
unified foreign policy goal across presidential administrations and that American polarization 
may meant that in the long term, U.S. diplomatic power may become weakened. 
Despite these negative consequences though, polarization’s influence in American foreign policy 
can be mitigated by reframing foreign policy as a matter of harm reduction and reducing the 
likelihood of accidental war. Furthermore, the system of Congressional committee seats could be 
revamped to become less partisan. Finally, a last solution would be for a return to America’s 
previous style of politics wherein one political party is dominant, thus reducing the ability of 
another party to change the country’s foreign policy. Thus, with one or a combination of these 
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